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ABSTRACT
AN ANALYSTS OF THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, SOUL CITY, N.C.
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of
Master in City Planning.
Harvey B. Gantt
Planning has often been variously described as a systematized process of
formulating goals and objectives, developing alternative plans and methods
congruent with those goals, choosing the best plan or method through cost-
benefit analysis (or some other method of evaluation), carrying through an
effective implementation, assessing or evaluating the results, and re-cycling
the whole procedure, if necessary, to maximize the fit between goals and the
final result.
This thesis studies the process of planning housing development (specifi-
cally low-income housing development) in a proposed new town called Soul
City to be located in eastern North Carolina. The developers of the town
bring a unique perspective to new town planning: (1) they are essentially
non-planners, inexperienced in new town development; and (2) their moriva-
tions for venturing into development go beyond profit to the level of
creating an environment in which specific economic and social goals will
advance the cause of disadvantaged, and disenfranchised minority groups.
Because of the strong social welfare overtones of the Soul City venture,
and the projected large proportion of low-income residents that will live
there, this thesis concentrates on the issues surrounding housing develop-
ment for this segment of the population, largely because of all income
groups in the country, housing has been least responsive to the needs of
low-income families. While other income groups have effectively utilized
the instruments of government and the working of the marketplace to achieve
some degree of responsiveness in housing, low-income groups have largely
been left with the left-overs and hand-me-downs of the existing housing
stock. The study will show that in the planning of the housing for low-
income families, successful implementation of social and physical objectives
are peculiarly tied to the prime developer's internalization of the needs
of that target market, his own peculiar financial situation during the
development process, and his ability to control and use sub-developers
(builders of housing) effectively.
The study was essentially empirical in format; the author's purpose
primarily being to look at the development of housing from the prime
developer's perspective, and thus to raise issues, opportunities, or
roadblocks that might bear on the projected success or failure of the
housing program. The major sources of information came from a series of
interviews with the McKissick Enterprises, Inc. staff (prime developers),
their consultants, and a group of potential sub-developers of housing in
Soul City. The resources of the University of North Carolina School of
City and Regional Planning were used for background data on housing in
North Carolina.
The conclusions drawn from the study are essentially these: (1) A town
proposed with a strong motivation to social welfare objectives necessarily
will be constrained by the hard-headed requirements of the business and
financial community, government bureaucracies, and the idiosyncratic moti-
vations of the builders and sub-developers at given periods in the town's
growth. (2) In the staging of development, laudable social goals (commu-
nity participation, homeownership, etc.) may only come in the late stages
of development and are dependent on the prime developer's financial position,
his use of sub-developers, his rapport with existing residents, and his
judicious deployment of profits in socially beneficial ways.
The author's lesson from the study is that the planning process is not a
well-Ciefined precise path to problem solution. Goal formulation may occur
at the beginning stages of the process, but may also re-occur even at the
so-called point of implementation. Plans are valueless, if they tend to
restrict key actors, and may be promptly abandoned in any given situation.
What is clear is that the planning process involves flexibility, constant
re-evaluation, and the willingness on the part of crucial actors to bargain,
politick, and exert powers at strategic points in time.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND ON THE SOUL CITY PROJECT
The development of new towns in America had never been a dominant strategy
for urban growth prior to the 1960's. But, with the increasing sprawl of
our existing metropolitan centers and the accompanying problems of over-
crowding and blighting "urban sprawl" planners, theorists, major developers,
and government have to some extent .begun to seriously consider ways of
diverting population away from the major population centers into new
"planned communities."1
The recent development of new towns like Reston, Columbia, and Irvine,
although built adjacent to major metropolitan centers, has awakened interest
in the possibilities of new towns as a way to solve some of the critical
social problems in our urban areas. Despite the fact that Restons and
Columbias are primarily inhabited by middle-class residents, many futurist
planners see new towns as a possible way of dispersing the huge minority
populations of the central city to outlying areas, largely to de-fuse the
socially pathological environment of the ghettos, but also to increase the
accessibility of the poor to manufacturing jobs that have been vacating
the central city for the suburbs.2 Albert Mayer sees new town growth as a
way to encourage growth in previously depressed areas of the country, thus
developing new "nodal" points around which new industry and population
3
could grow. Other strategists see "black" new towns as a viable urban
4
growth strategy largely developing on formerly held federal property.
Whatever the motivation, all of the new proposals envision new towns as
completely self-sufficient communities, where residents both live and work.
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Government policy now encourages new town development as evidenced by the
passage of legislation in 1968 to encourage private development of new
5
communities.
The Soul City new town proposal, although attempting to satisfy many of the
above goals, originated from a somenhat different orientation. When first
announced in January of 1969 by Floyd McKissick of McKissick Enterprises,
Inc., popular conception was that the town would be "open to all races"
6but primarily "created and developed by black people." There are subtle
implications about the Soul City concept that go beyond the usual reason for
venturing into new town development. To briefly understand how McKissick
arrived at his concept for Soul City, one must be aware of the changing
social and political environment of blacks in America.
Genesis of the Soul City Concept
Soul City probably had its beginning in the early days of 1966 when a
considerable number of black Americans (mostly young) were concerned about
the role they were playing in the economic and political environment of the
country. The civil rights struggle had produced a few hollow victories in
a legal sense (civil rights laws), but true social advancement by the masses
of black people was not yet a reality. Many young blacks, veterans of
frustrating years of civil rights campaigning and voter registration pro-
jects, felt that white America was still somehow implicitly challenging
their rightful status as first class citizens. Integration was a very slow
process (North and South), and the very reluctance of the larger society to
do so, drove many blacks to reject the sincerity of the American ideals of
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justice and equality. Indeed, many black Americans were convinced that
their unique experience in this country, in addition to their cultural
heritage from Africa, made the process of integration demeaning, since
they could not comfortably relate to many of the social and cultural mores
of the larger society.7
Thus in 1966, the now familiar cry of "black power" and community control
was heard, starting with the Meredith march in Mississippi and spreading
8
quickly throughout the land. The strategy was to gain or seize control
of communities where blacks predominated, with the intention of building
a social., political and economic power base that would be relevant and res-
ponsive to the needs of black people. The proponents of black power were
convinced that only in this way could blacks be truly creative and relevant
in a society which otherwise threatened their dignity and manhood. 9
The methods or strategies proposed to implement the black power concept
differed in degree depending on the size and age of the civil rights group
involved. They ranged from taking over sections of the continental United
States to form black states, to the less ambitious community control of
institutions within existing central cities with large black populations.
Older civil rights groups tended to adopt the less militant strategies of
community control.1 0
McKissick Enterprises, Inc., headed by Floyd McKissick, former chairman of
the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) had its roots in the old civil rights
faction, but had philosophically been leaning strongly in the direction of
the more militant black groups. In his recent book Three-Fifths of a Man,
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McKissick expresses many of the same problems and feelings that younger blacks
have, regarding the struggle for civil and human rights. It is his opinion
that integration was too slow and had only served to make the black man
"visible" in America, allowing only those token blacks with tremendous forti-
tude and courage to fight their way into the mainstream. In large part the
masses were left out. His position was that blacks were integrating from a
weak position, leading white Americans to believe that they (blacks) had
historically made no contributions to the building of this country. To reverse
this "racist" misconception, McKissick expresses the view that only through
the development of an economic and political power base could blacks begin
to command their, due respect. "Real power among a people is achieved only
when they make a contribution to the marketplace through the production and
control of economic goods, and not as mere consumers in that marketplace. By
economic control of goods, the spin-off effect in the social and political
environment will be significant."
Out of this basic belief in "black capitalism" (somewhat different from the
Nixon concept), McKissick formed McKissick Enterprises, Inc., a black
management firm engaged in facilitating industrial and economic development
for black people and other minority groups. To date their major project is
Soul City, a new town to be created by blacks, fundamentally for the purpose
of carrying through on the development of economic, political and social
institutions as a prototype solution for gaining power and dignity in this
country for previously disenfranchised people.
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Location of Soul City12
Soul City will be located in Warren County, North Carolina, approximately
fifty miles from the Raleigh-Durham metropolitan area of 300,000 population.
The county is largely rural, and its total population is 19,652, according
to 1960 census tract data. The county seat (Warrenton) has a population of
approximately 1,500 people, with the nearest town of any size being ten miles
away and having a population of 13,000 people.
Warren County is an economically depressed area. The median income for
famil'ies is $1,958. Less than 4% of the families earn $10,000 or more per
year. Of the 5,038 employed workers, 47.1% are farm workers. Although the
unemployment rate is only 2.7%, most farm workers work less' than thirty-nine
(39) weeks per year. The black population makes up better than two-thirds
of the total, the median income being $1,308, and the median school years
completed, 6.2 grades.
The site is located on the main transportation corridor reaching from the
industrial Piedmont area of North Carolina, to the major northern industrial
areas of Washington and New York. It is approximately one mile from Inter-
state 85 and fifteen miles from Interstate 95 (two major transportation
routes from the Southeast to the North). The Seaboard Coastline Railroad
(a major north-south trunkline) runs adjacent to the site.
Area and Population of Soul City
Ultimately Soul City is projected to cover 5,000 acres (about two times the
land area of Mt. Vernon, New York), with a population in twenty years of
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50,000 persons in 12,500 households. The proposed population is projected
to increase the size of the county by at least 45,000 persons (assuming a
percentage of existing population will re-locate to the new town). Average
residential density initially was projected to be about eight households
per acre (although this is under study) -- gross density will be 2.5 house-
holds per acre.
Income of Projected Population
Consultant reports reflected in the Soul City economic model indicate that
18,000 jobs (9,000 basic sector or manufacturing, 9,000 service or dependent)
would be required to support the population. Of these, 16,000 jobs would
support the 12,500 households, while 2,000 other jobs would go to residents
of the county commuting to Soul City. The projected breakdown in income will
be 44%' of households in the $3,000'$5,000 range; 27.6% in the $5,000-$8,000
range; and 28.4% in the $8,000-up range. Median projected income is $5,600
per household (the figures are 1969 dollars).
HousinZ
The developers project a need for 12,500 housing units to cover a broad
spectrum of income. Of this total amount, fully one-third of these units
will be built for low- and moderate-income families. In terms of housing
development, this is unprecedented in American new town communities, which
are heavily middle class, with few if any low-income residents. The task of
providing decent housing, within the income ranges of low-income families
may be difficult on its own. But to provide housing that is not only
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economical, but also physically and socially responsive to the users may be
even more tremendous. McKissick's solution to this problem may be a meaning-
ful lesson or demonstration for other areas in the country. His failure to
resolve the problem, on the other hand, may culminate in the ultimate failure
of the total concept of Soul City.
II. CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
Because I view the "solution" to the housing problem in Soul City as a key
variable in the success or failure of the town, and because of my own
peculiar interest in housing as a useful social and physical instrument for
human development, this thesis will focus on the proposed housing develop-
ment process as envisioned by the prime developer (M.1Kissick Enterprises) up
to this date, and will propose to that actor some of the crucial elements that
may be encountered in pursuing "successful" implementation of the housing
program. It is not my intention to diagram, or chart a checklist of do's
and don'ts for the prime developer; rather the purpose is to heighten the
developer's awareness of possible roadblocks or pitfalls that might cause the
housing program to miss the goals and objectives intended for it. The alter-
natives I offer are done so largely to maximize the fit between those stated
goals, taking into account the peculiar restraints that will continually
face the developers who must simultaneously make a profit while trying to
satisfy goals that have no economic return.
In narrowing the focus to purely the housing development process as it
affects low-income families, I have purposely assumed that all of the
-13-
objectives hoped for in other phases of the town's development are
satisfactory (i.e. that industrial, commercial, educational and other programs
are feasible). By assuming that these are given conditions, and that all
other aspects such as location, size of population, and income ranges are
also left unchanged, I am free to concentrate on the housing problems.
This does not mean, however, that policies and programs set down by the
prime developer in these areas are immutable, or unaffected by housing
issues (for indeed they will be), rather it means that as a starting point
to analyzing housing, all these other issues are fixed variables.
In a very real sense, little in the way of actual planning, as I know it,
(surveys, master plans, specific land use plans, etc.) has been done beyond
the preliminary stages for Soul City. From one viewpoint, this may be a
very good thing for a planner or theorist wishing to influence key actors
with new ideas or strategies. But from the viewpoint of studying and
analyzing a process of development, it is difficult because everything is
in a state of flux, allowing no concrete ideas to be tied down for specific
analysis. Thus, this study proved to be a blessing and a curse for me; for
on one hand, I felt that there was some opportunity to influence the
McKissick people because so little had actually been tied down, while on
the other hand it was difficult to determine whether or not their previous
actions and proposals were finalized enough to draw any reasonable conclu-
sions.
Because of this lack of "hard-line" information on the developer's intent,
I relied heavily on a series of interviews with the McKissick staff which
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extended over a period of six months. By extrapolating from these interviews
over that period I was able to get some fairly conclusive ideas about how
the developers viewed their roles with regard to housing dev elopment.
Possibly the most difficult task was getting them to agree on a set of speci-
fic objectives for housing, for I had considered this to be most important
a platform upon which to build my study. A second source of information
which gave me some insights into the developer's intent were the specific
documents submitted to federal agencies to obtain loan guarantees. They, in
effect, represented the only written statements describing the developer's
intent. Finally, the preliminary reports of various consultant groups were
used largely because they focused in on issues sometimes beyond the purview
of the prime developers.
Ideally I had hoped for a situation where the developer's definition of
criteria for housing development could be evaluated against their specific
planning proposals. What, in reality, resulted was a forcing of the deve-
loper to define objectives, and an examination of preliminary proposals to
evaluate their fit with those objectives. Because I found these proposals
lacking to some degree, I proposed a set of guidelines which I felt would
generally improve them. Finally the thesis evolved into studying a possible
path to implementation, relying heavily on sub-developer utilization, the
developer's financial position, and his use and control of sub-developers
and residents.
Chapter II describes the prime developer's internalization of the housing
process for low-income families in addition to outlining objectives and
previous proposals. Chapter III outlines my interpretation of how the
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housing plan can be systematically derived. The remaining chapters describe
a possible path to implementation of low-income housing, indicating my view
of specific actions and reactions required of the prime developer, McKissick
Enterprises.
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CHAPTER II. DEFINING THE PROGRAM FOR HOUSING IN SOUL CITY
I. ORGANIZATION FOR PlANNING SOUL CITY
McKissick Enterprises, the umbrella corporation for development of Soul City,
can be characterized as being long on ideas, social motivation, and dedica-
tion, but short on manpower, finances, and technical expertise. As of
April 1970, the entire professional staff consisted of Floyd McKissick
(the guiding spirit and chief articulator of the Soul City concept), two
young planners, an engineer, and a financial analyst. McKissick, to his
credit, has been skillful to date in compensating for his lack of manpower
and financial resources by utilizing a group of consultants (some paid) in
helping to gather the necessary preliminary data required by financial insti-
tutions and government agencies. His legal background (he is an attorney)
has also served him well in devising an intricate structure of subsidiary
corporations to carry through on implementation. (See Chart II-a.) To
minimize cost, he has legally divented McKissick Enterprises of direct res-
ponsibility for planning, by being instrumental in setting up a non-profit
regional planning agency (WRPC) which is eligible for Section 701 federal
funds.1 By installing a member of McKissick Enterprises at the head of that
agency he insures that the planning of Soul City will reflect his organiza-
tion's goals.
Nevertheless, McKissick does face the immediate problem of finding black
and minority manpower to fill needed positions, and to carry through on the
goal of utilizing blacks as the creators and developers of Soul City. To
date, most of his consultants have been white, but the developers hope that
by involving black schools in the preliminary stages, a resource for future
talent will have been established.
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Another problem confronting the corporation (and directly related to the
staffing problem) was that of financing or gaining financial backing. Chase
Manhattan had committed funds to purchase the first 2,000 acres of land, but
other institutions were proving to be reluctant in coming forth with funds
to support development. In fact, during the total period of this study, the
uppermost concern by the developers was the procurement of financial backing.
It was proving to be a vicious circle. Lending institutions were requiring
more definitive answers and plans to determine feasibility. Such plans were
not forthcoming from ME fast enough because of understaffing. Understaffing
was partially the result of meager financial resources. And so on.
II. OBJECTIVES FOR HOUSING IN SOUL CITY
In my earliest interviews with McKissick Enterprises, in November 1969, it
became clear that little in-depth thinking had gone into defining the
housing program, beyond the generalized goals that had become formal policy
for Soul City.2 (See Appendix A for a listing of these goals.) The inter-
views were with Floyd McKissick and Froncell Tolbert, the financial analyst.
What was most revealing was the fact that they saw housing as a mere physical
vehicle or platform through which residents would act out their roles in
Soul City. Tolbert, as expected, seemed to view housing strictly in terms
of economic feasibility and how it fitted into the overall economic model.
Little attention was focused on the housing process as a social or economic
instrument that could help satisfy other pertinent goals. While both parti-
cipants spoke of new innovations in housing development, they were largely
of a physical nature, referring to architectural styling or construction
technology, with almost no reference to "social" innovation.
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Table II-a. SOUL CITY ORGANIZATION FOR DEVELOPMENT
Actor or
Organization
McKissick Enter-
prises, Inc. (ME)
Soul City Deve-
lopment Corp.
(SCDC)
Warren Regional
Planning Asso-
ciation (WRPA)
Sub-developers.,
Soul City Tenants
& Developer
Association
Soul City
Foundation
C
Legal Relationship to
Soul City Development
Prime Developer and
Umbrella Corporation
Subsidiary corporation
of McKissick Enter-
prises
(No legal relationship
to McKissick Enter-
prises) Non-profit
semi-public agency.
Contractors and buyers
of land from SCDC.
Chief Governing Body
of developed areas
controlled by resi-
dents and SCDC.
Non-profit charitable
foundation (w/tax-
exempt status - no
legal relationship to
McKissick Enterprises
Major Function
Control of over-
all Soul City
development
Chief Land
Developers
Chief Planning
Agency for Soul
City and Regional
Environs.
Developer and
builders of spe-
cific parcels in
S.C.
To levy and
collect taxes and
charges on public
services. To
administer muni-
cipal functions.
Research and
Development re-
lated to educa-
tional & social
innovation.
Source of Funding
or Support
Lending Institu-
tions. Private
investors. Govern-
ment grants & loans.
Corporation equity.
McKissick Enter-
prises, Inc.
Government grants
under Section 701.
Lending institu-
tions. Corporate
resources. Private
investors.
McKissick Enter-
prises. Government
& foundation grants.
Private contribu-
tions.
McKissick Enter-
prises. Government
& foundation grants.
Private contributions.
Primary Means of
Revenue
Soul City Development
Corp. (Sale of land).
Soul City Association
(Interest payments).
Soul City Utility Co.
(Interest).
Sale of Developed
Land
Not applicable.
Sale or rental of
property to users.
Taxes and charges
for municipal
services.
Not applicable.
Table I-a. continued.
Soul City Utility Subsidiary of
Company McKissick Enter-
prises
To develop and
administer water &
sewer supply
Government grants
& loans. McKissick
Enterprises (Loans)
Lending Institu-
tions & other pri-
vate sources
Charges for water
and sewer services.
Hammer, Greene
& Siler
Hazen & Sawyer
Univ. of North
Carolina School
of City & Regional
Planning, Shaw
Univ., N. Car.
Central Univ.,
N. Car. A & T,
Howard Univ.
Howard Research
& Development
Corp. (The Rouse
Co.)
Chase-Manhattan
Bank
Economic Consul-
tants to ME
Engineering Con-
sultant to ME
Planning consultants
to WRPA & ME
Developer, consul-
tant to ME
Financial consultant
to McKissick Enter-
prises
To study feasi-
bility of jobs
and industrial
location in Soul
City area
Study feasibility
of utilities
(water & sewer),
soil tests, etc.
to support max.
development
Provision research
and data on
planning in N.C.
environment to -
study feasibility
of physical and
social impact of
new town in eastern
region of N.C.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
McKissick Enter-
prises (grants),
WRPA (grants,
university research
grants.
To advise the prime Not applicable.
developer of key
issues involved in
"New Town" building
To advise on
financial sources
for investment.
Not applicable.
Fee for services
from McKissick
Enterprises, Inc.
Fee for services
from McKissick
Enterprises, Inc.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
When questioned about the seemingly "traditional" outlook they expressed,
the response was that housing in and of itself had sever limitations as a
socializing device, and could be only used up to a point. For example,
McKissick agreed that training unskilled workers in construction was a quite
useful way of furthering economic goals, but felt that prospective users of
housing need not be involved in the design of housing units, especially
when "responsive" designers could be used more efficiently. Furthermore,
there seemed to be an underlying feeling that by significantly improving
the quality of housing and the housing environment over that which most
low-income residents were accustomed to, the residents would not particu-
larly care to have a more involved role in critical design and planning
areas. Homeownership and tenant participation in management during post-
development were issues around which they agreed it was socially important
to insure for all residents.
Because these earlier interviews were unsuccessful in getting some well
defined set of housing objectives, I decided to use a different tactic. In
subsequent interviews in early February 1970, I tried to focus the dis-
cussion on the possible client for low-income housing in Soul City. These
interviews involved two additional participants: Gordon Carey, chief
planner for WRPA, and Duncan McNeil, an engineer with ME.3 Both were
directly involved with planning at the Soul City site and seemingly brought
a more socially aware perspective to the housing issue. (Both felt that
through indigenous community groups, the development of housing should be
controlled to a large extent by the people.) The following assumptions
about the nature of the client for low-income housing were agreed upon
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almost unanimously, by the McKissick staff. (The statistical data was taken
from a 1966 poverty program survey.) 4
(1.) Racial make-up: Approximately 65% black, most of these (60%)
from surroun ing areas. Only about 15-to-20 percent will
compise whites, although many more whites will want to take
advantage of job opportunities in Soul City. Remaining low-
income population (15%) other minority groups.
(2.) Family size and composition: Small families during early
years, possibly a predominance of young couples and single
males. Progressively larger families during middle years
and onward. Elderly couples expected near end of develop-
ment. Female-headed households during middle years. It
is expected that the town will be quite attractive to
young black married couples and single males and females.
(3.) Education: The level of education among rural blacks and
whites is expected to be lower than their counterparts in
urban areas. (Although Warren County's median education
for blacks is only 6.2 grades, recent reports indicate
- that 95% of children between the ages of seven and sixteen
are in attendance at public schools which would mean that
the future adult population will be significantly better
educated.) Most incoming adult population, whether rural
or urban, will require some form of adult education.
(4.) Social and Political Characteristics: Both rural and
urban poor tend to live in peer group societies, with
major social activities centering around the community
store, church, bar, dancehall, etc. The circumscribed
area of activity is small, rarely.going far beyond the
"bounds" of the familiar community. Politically, black
rural and urban southerners have been traditionally domi-
nated by white society, but visible progress on civil
rights are rapidly changing docility and passiveness into
active and energetic involvement. (Warren County has an
active poverty agency, and the 1968 elections saw the
running of an unsuccessful black candidate for Congress.)
The northern urban blacks, due to mass communication and
his familiarity with the vote is likely to have a more
sophisticated appreciation of politics and its limita-
tions than his southern counterpart. On the other hand,
he is likely to be more embittered and fatalistic about
the possibilities of advancement through political means
than hiw now enthusiastic southern counterpart.
(5.) Housing conditions: The rural poor live primarily in
dilapidated single family units. (In Warren County 50%
of the housing is structurally unsound, 50% was built
before 1929, and 23% is overcrowded.) Many of the rural
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poor own their homes (49% of homes in Warren County are
owner-occupied) and few pay anything to rent (96.3% of
Warren County families live in a rent-free status). The
urban poor tend to live in high density, over-crowded
apartment buildings. Most of these are in substandard
condition.
Note: (The assumptions on housing prompted some interesting questions
to the prime developer relating to problems of acculturation of rural
families accustomed to living in single family housing that may have
to accept higher density dwelling. Also, the fact that many rural
poor now pay nothing from their income for housing might also create
problems in terms of their value orientation to rent and mortgage
payments.)
(6.) Employment and training: Primary occupation among rural
poor is farming (47.1% farmers vs. 16.9% in manufacturing
jobs in Warren County). Among the urban poor, characteri-
stic occupations are of a service and menial nature. In
both cases significant training programs would be required
for preparation in manufacturing job skills.
Although clarification of the client was a helpful beginning step in defining
the housing program, it was not until late February that the issue of objec-
tives was resolved in the minds of the prime developer. McKissick and staff
attended the presentation of a report on Soul City planning in February
which was done by student and faculty at the University of North Carolina
School of City and Regional Planning. The presentation involved a three-
team report on various alternative methods for pursuing development of the
new town consistent with the overall town goals. Contained in the body of
these reports were specific housing objectives which varied in actual wording
but were consistent in overall intent. McKissick's people were impressed by
the work of the UNC teams, and were also suddenly armed with a set of
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objectives to satisfy my needs and requirements. By chance I visited UNC
a few days after the presentation to McKissick's staff and had a chance to
review written reports. In a subsequent interview in New York in March,
the developers had modified the original objectives, but seemed relieved
to reveal that they had arriv ed at some specific definition of their total
5
housing program.
In retrospect, the whole effort to force the developers into defining
criteria and objectives ended in a kind of "hollow" victory for me. Clearly
they were more important to me and possibly others of the "academic planning"
ilk than they were to a private developer who had to carry the burden of
economic constraints and social responsi-bility and effect some balance
between the two. In fact, I'm not sure if the objectives stated below are
worth the paper they are written on, in the sense that they may or may not
be operational. Nevertheless, as "artificial" as they might be, I used them
here because they provide a convenient platform for evaluating the proposals
submitted to government agencies and also were useful in developing alter-
natives for implementation in the latter section of this thesis.
Objective #1 - To provide decent shelter for all in a housing
environment conducive to individual and community self-develop-
ment, without regard to race or income.
Criteria:
- a pattern of development that exceeds the "average"
American community in terms of racial and economic access
to decent housing;
- the elimination of sub-standard and dilapidated units
from the housing inventory of Soul City;
- significant participation by tenants and residents in
the control of their housing environment.
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Procedure:
- enforcement of an "open" housing policy by Soul City
Association;
- provision by prime developer of full complement of
basic services to all housing units.
Objective #2 - To reduce the distinction between socio-economic
groups through the dispersion of housing in a heterogeneous
economic pattern.
Criteria:
- the elimination of housing sub-divisions predicated on
income class as is prevalent in most American cities and
suburbs;
- the encouragement of social interaction by proximate
location of housing by residents of varying income classes
and life styles.
Procedure:
- implementation of a physically and socially relevant
land development strategy.
Objective #3 - The inclusion of a minimum of one-third of the
total housing stock for the development of low and moderate
income housing.
Criteria:
- to insure decent housing for residents of low-income
that would exceed the quality of housing currently being
received in the average American city;
- to offer, through participation and homeownership,
housing as a "stake" for the poor in the community.
Procedure:
- formal policy by prime developer to build stipulated
units by using all available resources of the government
and business community to support development.
Objective #4 - To maximize accessibility to all vital activities
for all residents.
Criteria:
- the reduction of the percentage of activities requiring
access by automobiles;
- all-encompassing development of low-cost transit system.
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Procedure:
-implementation of a land use plan that encourages higher
density development and a closely-grained mix of residen-
tial and other uses.
Objective #5 - The provision of a variety of housing types in
varying density classifications, available to all income groups
and family sizes.
Criteria:
-inclusion of prevalent consumer types and styles of housing;
-elimination of a bleak, monotonous physical housing environ-
ment;
-minimization of the difficulty of fitting individual
families to "appropriate" housing.
Procedure:
-control by prime developer of sub-developer utilization of
parcels;
-evaluation by design review board of sub-developer's plan
for development.
Objective #6 - To provide housing that is physically responsive
to changing life cycles and styles over the long and short run.
Criteria:
-minimization of the social and economic cost of moving;
-maximization of the degree of flexibility for change in
each housing unit (i.e. units should be expandable or
convertible to other uses).
Procedure:
-periodic evaluation by social agencies (Soul City Foundation)
of user accommodation to housing and housing environment;
-land development strategy to encourage expansion or move-
ment within and without neighborhoods with minimum difficulties;
-research supported by prime developer into building techno-
logy to find new methods and designs to increase flexibility
of building materials.
The Soul City Housing Proposal
Shortly after the above objectives were decided upon, McKissick Enterprises
submitted to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) a proposal
for Soul City development for the purpose of securing a federal guarantee as
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provided under the 1968 New Communities Act. The following is an excerpt
from the Housing Section of that report:
Housing will be planned for a wide range in family size and composition.
Accommodations will be made for the single person, couples, and for
families with large numbers of children. Some families will have only
one adult.
It is expected that a significantly larger proportion of families
will come from low income brackets than is typical in other new
towns. No other planned community in the United States has the
preponderance of low income families as projected for Soul City.
This produces unique problems in terms of the economic model. It
will also produce the architectural challenge of building large
numbers of low-cost housing units which are attractive and which
are not subject to progressive deterioration. Nevertheless, McKissick
Enterprises, Inc., is confident that, through the use of the best
available architectural and technical support, it can produce suffi-
cient low-cost housing which will be both economical and attractive.
Soul City will not have the appearance of a drab "company" town nor
the bleak sterility of so many suburban housing developments.
Soul City will probably encompass three separate villages and
twelve distinct neighborhoods which will be developed sequentially,
Each neighborhood will comprise clusters of houses and will contain
an integrated mix of low income and upper income housing.
A variety of housing facilities is contemplated for each neighborhood
to accommodate the variances in family size, composition and income
levels. Single family dwelling units, ranging from one-fifth acre
lots and larger will be provided. The plan will also include two-
family dwellings, town houses, garden apartments, mid-rise apartments
and a hotel with efficiency apartments.
Variety in style of housing is equally important. The developers are
considering developing neighborhoods or small sub-divisions around
particular motifs, some of which might well be ethnic...
The accomplishment of an economic variety in style and type will be
dependent on the use of innovative housing technology. Considerable
exploration of new technology and an immense amount of planning is
required to achieve our goals for housing. The planners will seek
the most competent architectural support from a wide variety of sources...
Building and design standards will be of the highest order. Building codes
can be developed which are free from many of the outmoded constraints
and restrictions which hamper low-cost construction in many other areas.
Similarly, with proper planning, direction and supervision, relatively
unskilled persons can be trained to do much of the construction.
-28-
Some of the very low cost housing (10,000-12,000) could be constructed
by previously unskilled workers who could be trained in particular
aspects of construction and who could build the houses they will live
in.
Homeownership and control will be a prime goal, however some innovative
requirements may be necessary. For example, we must be able to secure
home mortgages for purchasers without good credit records. Furthermore,
methods of securing sufficient equity for poor families must be
devised...
Generally, residential construction will be done by builders who
purchase tracts of land from the Soul City Development Corporation.
Adequate control over design, building standards 6and housing prices
can be achieved through covenants and contracts.
The statement seems to reflect the six objectives fairly closely, although my
opinion is that the social goals were played down more, with greater emphasis
on.physical planning. Table II-b. was submitted along with the proposal.
It shows twelve different housing types at varying densities. There are
interesting conflicts apparent, not the least being the fact that none of
the data is backed by any systematic analysis of the potential market.
In direct conflict with Objectives #2 and #5, it appears that low-income
families will be restricted to particular types of housing units. As the
allocations are presented in Table II-b., it appears that families making
below $4,000/year are ineligible for single family detached housing, or for
homeownership. On the other end of the housing spectrum, upper-income fami-
lies have no options for living in rental housing, since most rentals occur
at the lower-income levels. Equally interesting is the fact that the pre-
ponderance of housing for middle and upper income groups is of the single
family variety. There would appear to be little chance for high-income
families to live at higher densities, unless they buy up housing intended
for low-income families.
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Table
Catego
II-b.
ry
I
II
ALLOCATION OF FAMILY INCOME TO TYPE
Type of Unit
Low-Income Apartments 50/acre
"Piggy Back" Apartments
(Attached) 36/acre
Subsidized Attached (Garden)
16/aere
Mid-Income Apartments 40/acre
Attached (Garden-Rowhouse)
16/acre
Attached "Piggy Back" 14/acre
Attached (Garden Apartments -
Townhouse) 14/acre
Attached (Townhouses) 12/acre
Detached 1/5 acre
Detached 1/4 acre
Attached (Townhouses -
Duplexes) 10/acre
Detached 1/2 acre
Detached one acre
Total Residential Acreage-1,629
$ 6,000-$ 7,000
$ 7,000-$10,000
$10,000-$15,000
$10,000-$15,000
$15,000-$25,000
$25,000+
OF HOUSING*
Family Income
$ 2,000-$ 3,000
$ 3,000-$ 4,000
$ 4,000-$ 5,000
*Taken from: A Proposal for Funds for Soul City Development, McKissick Enterprises, Inc.,
March 14, 1970.
$
$
$
$
4,000-$
4,000-$
5,000-$
5,000-$
III
IV
V
VI
VII
I
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
XIII
5,000
5,000
6,000
6,000
Housing Price
Rental
Rental
Rental
Rental
$10,000-$13,000
$15,000
$12,000-$14,000
$14,000-$17 ,500
$15,000-$25,000
$20,000-$35,000
$25,000-$30,000
$30,000-$50,000
$40,000+
Number of Units
500
2,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
500
1,450
750
2,100
1,000
300
800
100
Total-12,500
HOUSING TYPE VS. UNIT LAND SALES PRICE* (IN THOUSANDS)
Unit Type and Density
DEVELOPMENT YEAR
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
Townhouse 10/acre.
Mid-rise Apartments 40/acre
Single-Family Detached
(1/4 acre)
Single-Family Detached
(1/2 acre)
Single-Family Detached
(one acre)
3.5 3.9 4.7 5.0 .5.0
..5
.5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
0.7
4.0 4.5 5.3 6.0 6.4
5.0 5.6 6.5 7.5 7.9
7.5 8.5 9.5 10.7 12.5
6.6 .6.7 .,6.7 6.7 6.9
8.5 9.0 9.6 9.6 10.0
13.8 15.8 16.3 16.3 16.3
Table II-d. RESIDENTIAL LAND USE ALLOCATION - SOUL CITY*
SOUL CITY
Acres UnitsUnit Type
COMMUNITY "X"
Acres Units
COMMUNITY "Y"
Acres Units
COMMUNITY "Z"
Acres Units
Townhouse 10/acre
Mid-rise Apartments 40/acre,
Single-Family Detached
(1/4 acre)
Single-Family Detached
(1/2 acre)
Single-Family Detached
(one acre)
625 6,250
20 800
605 2,420
625 1,250
625 625
209 2,090
10 400
205
209
209
820
418
209
208 2,080
10 400
200
208
208
800
416
208
208 2,080
200
208
208
2,500 11,345 842 3,937 834 3,904
800
416
208
824 3,504
*Taken from Soul City Economic Model, McKissick Enterprises, Inc., April
Category
I
II
III
IV
V
L. Category
I
II
III
IV
V
Total
Table II-c.
4, 1970.
Table II-e. COMPARISON OF INITIAL AND CURRENT HOUSING PLAN*
Density
Unit Type Initial
Number of Units
Current Initial Current
Low-Rent Apartments
Mid-Rent Apartments
50/acre
36/acre
40/acre
Attached Units (Rowhouses,
Townhouses, Garden Apartments)
Single-Family Units
40/acre
From 18/acre 10/acre
To 10/acre
5/acre
4/acre
2/acre
1/acre
4/acre
2/acre
1/acre
2,500
1,000
5,000
2,100
1,000
800
100
Total - 4,000
Total Units - 12,500
800
6,250
2,420
1,250
625
4,295
11,345
Table II-f. COMPARISON OF LAND SALES PROCEEDS*
Description Acres Developed % of Total Acres Proj. Proceeds
(Millions)
% of Total
Proceeds
Residential
Industrial
Commercial
Total
**Represents the total land inventory on the market for sale to sub-developers.
* Data extrapolated from Soul City Economic Model, McKissick Enterprises, Inc., April 4, 1970.
2,500
750
500
3,750**
63.666.7%
20%
13.3%
100%
9.2
19.1
91.9
69%
10%
21%
100%
Although the statement indicates that housing would be "planned for a wide
range of family size and composition," and that "economic variety in style
and type" would be offered to the consumer, the table does not bear these
points out clearly. It would seem difficult to relate family income to the
type of housing when there is no indication of family size or composition.
Equally frustrating (and in refutation of Objective #2) is the fact that,
as presented in Table II-b., there would appear to be some stigmatization
of income groups,- i.e. apartment dwellers are poor people since there is,
no allocation of apartments for people of higher income.
To some extent, McKissick Enterprises recognized these and other difficulties
with their projected housing plan. To this end they submitted a revised
proposal in March to HUD which abandoned the allocation table for a more
generalized housing proposal. Table II-c. shows this proposal which simply
related housing type with the projected price of land. Table II-d. also
shows the extent of housing development by type over the three projected
communities. Note that the total number of housing units has been reduced
from 12,500 units to 11,345 units. In the initial proposal the total acreage
allocated to housing was 1,629. This acreage has been increased to 2,500
acres or half of the total area of Soul City. The shift to a lower density
was a conscious policy decision made by McKissick, who was concerned that
the original densities were inconsistent with small town patterns in that
section of North Carolina. The original density represented 8 units per
acre or 32 people per acre (assuming an average of four persons per unit).
The new density would allocate 4.5 units per- acre (or 18 persons per acre).
To cut the density in half, the developers reduced the emphasis on mid-rise
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apartments, reduced the density of town houses and garden apartments, and
increased the number of single family houses on larger lots (eliminating
the 1/5 acre lot). Table II-e. shows the overall-.changes.
Rather than allocate housing by income, the developers chose to make the
assumption that for each category of housing type, a range of family
incomes could be accommodated. Thus there is no apparent distinction as
to where low-income families can locate. However, I'm of the opinion that
the new proposal further penalizes low-income families if for no other reason
than the fact that a lower density, with a very coarse grain, will raise the
unit price of land so high as to make them unfeasible for low-income
development. When you consider that the unit prices for each housing type
are constant for all income groups, then the low-income family desiring to
purchase a 1/4-acre lot must pay a considerably higher relative price to
build his $10,000 house on that property, than the middle-income buyer who
wants to build a $25,000 house.
It is clear that at lower densities, the cost of infra-structure development
is increased for the prime developer. The increased cost in this case is
passed on to the residential consumer. In fact, Table II-f. reveals that
residential and commercial land proceeds actually subsidize industrial pro-
perty in Soul City. McKissick's associates agreed that the lower land prices
for industrial development were intended to induce location in the Soul City
area. While that policy may be encouraging to industrialists, it is
doubtful whether or not residents and sub-developers will be willing to
accept paying $35,000 per acre for town house development when industry
pays only $2,000 (see Table II-c. for year #1).
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There are numerous other difficulties with both proposals which I feel
reflect the rather arbitrary assumptions upon which they were predicated.
A more structural and in-depth analysis of housing needs which started with
thorough market data and information on prospective users seemingly would
offer a better point of departure for evolving a relevant housing plan.
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CHAPTER III. ALTERNATIVE GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING HOUSING PROPOSAL
Because I feel that the housing plan is crucial to the discussion of how
housing development should proceed in Soul City, this chapter reflects my
views of the necessary criteria or guidelines needed to arrive at such a
plan.
To arrive at a reasonable program for low-income housing, the critical
factors that need consideration and analysis by the prime developer are
listed:
(1.) Definition of what determines a low-income family.
(2.) Identification of the key areas of possible emigration of
low-income families.
(3.) Correlation of family size and composition with housing type.
(4.) Correlation of potential market with staging of development.
(5.) Analysis of land and construction cost.
I. DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A LOW-INCOME FAMILY
Because the prime developer intends to exploit federal subsidy programs, it
seems reasonable to assume that the income limits attached to the various
federal programs will decide what families are eligible for low-income sub-
sidy programs. The most likely programs for new construction are Section 235
and Section 236 of the 1968 Housing Act and Public Housing (to include Leasing
and Turnkey programs). Table III-a. indicates the maximum income limits by
family size for each program if used in Warren County. (See Appendix B for
a brief description of housing programs.)
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Table III-a. FEDERAL INCOME LIMITS ($) - PUBLIC HOUSING - SECTIONS 235 and 236* (WARREN COUNTY)
NUMBER OF PERSONS IN FAMILY
Housing Program 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Public Housing (including
Turnkey, Leasing)
Sections 235 and 236
$3,000 $3,500 $3,700 $3,900 $4,100 $4,300 $4,400 $4,500
$4,050 $4,725 $4,995 $5,265 $5,535 $5,805 $5,940 $6,075
$4,600 $4,700
$6,210 $6,345
*Taken from HUD Handbook, FHA 4400.30 - Income Limits for Sections 235 and 236 Housing.
Table III-b. PROBABLE COMBINATIONS OF HOUSING SIZES W/FAMILY SIZE (NOT INCLUSIVE)*
# in
Household
Possible Family
Composition
Probable # of
BR's Needed
# in Possible Family
Household Composition
Probable # of
BR's Needed
Single Person
Married
2 Single Adults
Adult, 1 Child
Married, 1 Adult
Married, 1 Chld
Single Ad., 2 Ch.Same
Single Ad., 2 Ch.Opp.
2 Single Ads, 1 Child
Sex
Sex
Marr., 2 Ch., Same Sex
Marr., 2 Ch., Opp. Sex
Marr., 1 Adult, 1 Child
1 Ad., 3 Ch., Same or Opp.
2 Single Ads, 2 Ch., Same
2 Single Ads, 3 Ch., Opp.
Marr., 3 Ch., Same or Opp.
Marr., I Ad., 2 Ch., Same
1 Ad., 4 Ch., Opp. Sex
I Ad., 4 Ch., Same Sex
2 Single Ads., 3 Ch. Same
Eff. Apartment
1 Bedroom
2 Bedrooms
2 Bedrooms
2 Bedrooms
2 Bedrooms
2 Bedrooms
3 Bedrooms
3 Bedrooms
2 Bedrooms
3 Bedrooms
3 Bedrooms
3 Bedrooms
3 Bedroois
4 Bedrooms
3 Bedrooms
3 Bedrooms
4 Bedrooms
3 Bedrooms
4 Bedrooms
6 Marr., 4 Ch., Same Sex
Marr., 4 Ch., Opp.( 2-2)
Marr., 4 Ch., Opp.(3-1)
Marr., 1 Ad., 3 Ch., Same
l Ad., 5 Ch., Same or Opp.
2 Single Ads., 4 Ch., Same
2 Single Ads., 4 Ch., Opp.
Sex (3-1)
3 Bedrooms
3 Bedrooms
4 Bedrooms
4 Bedrooms
4 Bedrooms
4 Bedrooms
5 Bedrooms
7 Marr., 5 Children, Same 4 Bedrooms
Marr., 5 Ch., Opp.(3 -2 ,4-1)4 Bedrooms
Marr., 1 Ad., 4 Ch., Same 4 Bedrooms
1 Ad., 6 Children, Same 4 Bedrooms
1 Ad., 6 Ch., Opp. (4-2) 4 Bedrooms
1 Ad., 6 Ch., Opp.(3-3,5-1)5 Bedrooms
2 Single Ads, 5 Ch., Same 5 Bedrooms
2 Single Ads.,5 Ch., Opp.
(3-2,4-1) 5 Bedrooms
*Taken from: Low-Income Housing Study,
Chapel Hill, Orange County. Unpublished
Report - University of North Carolina -
Taylor - Coble.
9 10
1
2
3
4
5
00I
Thus a typical family of four with an adjusted gross income not in excess of
$3,900 would be eligible for public housing and a similar family with an
adjusted gross income not in excess of $5,265 would be eligible for rental
housing under Section 236 or homeownership under Section 235.
According to the Hammer Report, the potential income range of jobs projected
for Soul City will start at $2,000/year on up. The $2,000 income represents
a salary paid for part-time work, or supplemental income made by a housewife
or a commuting farmer working a second job. Thus it seems reasonable to
assume that in any extreme case, the bottom income for any working family in
Soul City will exceed the $2,000/year level, which conceivably could allow all
such.families to be covered under any of the above named housing programs.
For the purposes of these guidelines, we shall assume that the limits of
Table III-a. define what constitutes a low-income family in Soul City.
II. IDENTIFICATION OF KEY AREAS OF EMIGRATION
McKissick's assumptions on where the low-income population will come from
(page 23 ) may or may not be accurate; in any event it is at best a guess.
To identify potential target areas would seemingly involve an analysis of
factors that might tend to make prospective residents emigrate. Assuming
that the developer can arbitrarily identify the target areas, such an analy-
sis should evaluate the following:
(1.) The existing housing conditions in low-income neighborhoods
(number of standard, sub-standard, and dilapidated units).
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(2.) The availability of existing standard housing in the regional
area accessible to low-income families (would indicate vacancy rate
and demand for better housing).
(3.) The total volume of new construction underway or projected
for low-income families (to determine whether housing conditions
are likely to undergo significant changes).
(4.) Correlation of income of low-income families with rental paid
for housing (to determine the "cost" of housing relative to total
income).
(5.) Comparison of the number homeowners vs. renters living in
sub-standard housing (renters of sub-standard housing are more likely
to move before owners).
Further information regarding family composition may also be gathered
depending on the specific requirements of the prime developer or potential
sub-developers. For example:
(6.) Determination of family sizes and composition in sub-standard
housing (couples, female-headed families, elderly singles, etc.).
(7.) Correlation of family size with dwelling type to determine
accustomed living pattern.
It is doubtful whether or not any market analysis will reveal information on
the exact number of people that would consider moving to Soul City. What the
above guidelines can do is help in formulating an attractiveness index which
might point up the potential for emigration from certain areas. Once such an
index indicates a positive attraction or potential for migration, it is the
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developer's responsibility to catalyze a reaction through publicity, and
other methods. The market analysis has other limitations. It can only show
where people are or their present state of existence. It can say little
about how people choose to live given an opportunity to change. To get at
that problem would require other measures.
III. CORRELATION OF FAMILY SIZE AND COMPOSITION WITH HOUSING TYPE
Assuming that an attractiveness index can be correlated to family size in
the target market area, some idea about housing style and type can possibly
be evaluated. In sizing units, the criteria established under the federal
subsidy programs seem to be reasonable.2 One bedroom is allocated for a
maximum of two adult persons. Where there are children, one bedroom is
allocated for two persons provided they are of the same sex. To illustrate,
a family of four (two adults, boy and girl) would require at least three
bedrooms. Table III-b. shows the number of possible options available for
varying family sizes.
By having some idea of size of unit related to family composition the
developers may be given license to make some assumptions or predictions
about possible preference of housing type and density. Although it is cer-
tainly impossible to accurately predict the preferences of individual
families, the prime developer can generally predict prevalent patterns.
For example, elderly couples would probably prefer multi-family low-to-
medium density housing accessible to public transit and other vital
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activities, rather than the one-acre single-family house. Or families with
minor children would prefer low density multi-family or single-family houses
rather than mid-rise or high-rise apartments.
An example of the kind of breakdown that might be beneficial is Table III-c.,
which indicates some of the possible types of users and their assumed prefe-
rences. Such a table may be used to predict the type of housing units
needed based on the composition and size of potential families likely to
move into the new town.
IV. STAGING OF RESIDENTIAL FLOW WITH OVERALL DEVELOPMENT
After developing a preliminary model on preferences, some consideration must
be given to what segment of the target population is likely to move first.
Conceivably the attractiveness factor for each family will vary over a period
of time and will depend not only on their existing living conditions, but
also on factors of location, availability of services and amenities, and
employment opportunities in Soul City.
1. Factors of Location
It does not seem unreasonable to predict that, all other things being equal,
families living closest to Soul City will migrate first. Given the fact
that the cost of moving among low-income families is not trivial, families
moving from New York City are likely to be more economically constrained
than a family moving from Henderson, N. C. (ten miles away from the Soul City
area). Larger families from far-away places are likely to encounter greater
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Table III-c. SAMPLE LIST OF PREFERENCES BY FAMILY COMPOSITION
First Preference
Area of Emigration Family Composition Housing Type Density*
Second Preference
Housing Type Density
Urban North
Urban South
Rural or Urban South
Urban North
Rural or Urban South
Urban North
Single Person
Married Couple
(Childless)
Married Couple w/
Children (Minor)
Married Couple w/
Children (Non-minor)
Elderly Couple
Elderly Couple
Apartment
Complex'
Garden
Apartment
Single-
family
Single-
family
Single-
family
Garden
Apartment
High-to-
Med. Dens.
Med. Dens.
Low Dens.
Low-to-
Med. Dens.
Low Dens.
Low-to-
Med. Dens.
Townhouse
Apartment
Complex
Duplex or
Townhouse
Townhouse
or Garden
Apartment
Duplex
Mid-rise
Apartment
Med. Dens.
High-to-
Med. Dens.
Low- to-
Med. Dens.
Med. Dens.
Low-to-
Med. Dens.
Med.-to-
High Dens.
*For this chart I assume the following density classification:
High Density - 40 to 50 units/acre or more
Med. Density - 14 to 30 units/acre
Low Density - 1 to 12 units/acre
U.)
I
inertial problems in moving than couples or single persons who are more
mobile, having accumulated little in the way of durable goods.
Another factor affected by location is information and the cost of getting
it. Those families located in the area are able to observe (almost first-
hand) the developments in Soul City. Consequently, information on new
job opportunities, social services, or housing are likely to be positive
stimulants for migration. Those residents living far away may be required
to exert considerably more effort to ascertain the same quality of infor-
mation.
2. Job Opportunities
The availability of jobs undoubtedly is a key determinant of what the
population make-up will be over the long-run. Initially, if construction
and other jobs requiring physical labor are predominant, it is reasonable
to expect that the locating population may be predominantly young male
singles rather than female head-of-household types. Likewise, jobs
requiring specific training or specific educational requirements may pre-
empt migration of certain family types. Clearly the nature of industrial
committments to Soul City at any one time will be a positive indication
of the composition of the incoming population.
3. Availability of Services and Other Amenities
Very possibly Soul City in early years will resemble a "frontier" town.
Those residents choosing to move in first may be forced to live in ~tem-
porary quarters (mobile homes?) and ancillary services like shopping,
entertainment, and recreation may be minimal, quartered in temporary
facilities, and in content very crude. Transportation may be difficult
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and almost non-existent except by car. Health services (although projected
to start with the first resident) is likely to be only an outpatient clinic
offering remedial services. All of these factors will tend to reduce the
attractiveness of Soul City for some families. Large families with
children of school age may be reluctant because of underdeveloped educa-
tional facilities. Elderly persons requiring medical attention may also
refrain from locating. Those families without cars or other means of
transportation may not be willing to accept the immobility. Later stages
when more services are available would likewise allow the prime developer
a chance to predict what groups were likely to locate.
Up to this point I have concentrated on market factors as they primarily
relate to the staging of development in Soul City. Presumably at this
point the prime developer can begin to devise a housing plan which can
generally indicate the nature of incoming population (income, size,
family composition, etc.), the areas of emigration, and the probable
size of units and preference of housing type desired. By constantly up-
dating this market information periodically, the developer can reasonably
assure his sub-developers that the housing built in Soul City is consis-
tent with the characteristics of the locating population.
The final criterion needed in this analysis is an evaluation of cost of
housing and its relationship to residents' ability to pay.
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Probable Cost of Low-Income Units
We have said little at this point about producing housing that is affordable
by low-income residents. Although the prime developer, in reality, does
not finally control the cost of housing, the price of land represents a
significant part of the cost of housing (up to 25% according to Kaiser
Report). Thus, it is the prime developer's responsibility before setting
the final price on land to assess what the probable cost of producing a
variety of housing types for low-income families will be.
Again we turn to the federal housing programs as a useful criterion for
defining the upper limits on construction cost. In arriving at the appro-
priate federal programs the developer may need to do some preliminary
investigations on feasibility:
a. identification of the two, three or four potential programs
that would satisfy Soul-City housing requirements;
b. determination of whether funding is available (authorized
and appropriated by Congress) and if so, the amount of committ-
ments allocated to the regional office (in this case Region III-
Atlanta);
c. evaluation of each program's statutory cost limits to
ascertain whether they were within the limits of North Carolina
construction cost data.
As an example, let us assume that Section 235 and 236 housing have been
evaluated as feasible programs for rental and homeownership housing in
Soul City. Table III-d. gives the maximum mortgage limits for both pro-
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grams for the North Carolina area. To correlate these limits with
prevailing North Carolina cost figures, I extrapolated from a report done
by U.N.C. team of researchers who did a study on low-income housing for
the Chapel Hill-Orange County area. Table III-e. shows recent construc-
tion cost averages (exclusive of land cost) in that area for various
housing programs.
The study also made some realistic assessments of prevailing cost of
urban land in the Chapel Hill area by economic neighborhoods. Table III-f.
and Table III-g. show respectively the cost of land/unit for multi-family
housing and the cost of lots for single family housing (no indication of
actual lot sizes were given).
In the case of Soul City, let us assume that the marketable price of
land for low to moderate income families, considering neighborhood quality
falls within the Chapel Hill range of moderate-income. Adding 10% to each
of these figures (to account for inflation and the new town factor) would
indicate that probable market cost of land in Soul City should be, on the
average, $935/unit for multi-family units and $3,300/lot for single-family
units. (Note: it does not seem unreasonable to assume that Chapel Hill
prices are applicable for Soul City, given the similarity in size of both
towns and the proximity of Chapel Hill - 50 miles away - to the Soul City
area). By combining the market price of land with the unit cost of con-
struction (for Sections 235 and 236) we get some picture of housing cost
for multi-family and single-family housing. (Table III-h., Table III-i.)
The figures seem to indicate that the total cost of units falls
within statutory limits. However, once the correlation has been made
between prevailing cost and statutory limits, the developer must assess
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whether or not the projected price of land is reasonable enough to cover
c'osts and return a profit. There is the possibility that in Soul City,
where a preponderance of housing is low-income, the land costs may have
to be subsidized by the prime developer, or passed on to other users in
higher land prices.
Finally the whole analysis of construction cost must bear some relationship
to the income of low-income tenants. Under most government-subsidized
programs, rental limits and mortgage payments are set by specific laws.
For example, under 236, maximum rents cannot exceed 25% of adjusted
gross income. Under 235, 20% of adjusted gross income can be allocated
to mortgage and interest payment. Similar situations exist under Public
Housing. In that regard, the developers may want to make an analysis of
the minimum incomes needed to support the cost of housing for each cate-
gory or type of housing units. (I.e., a family of four requiring a
three-bedroom house costing $11,300 would need a minimum income of "X"
dollars/year to be eligible for a mortgage under Section 235.)
If in reality the developer finds that costs are so high as to render
the most of the low-income population ineligible, McKissick may be faced
with reducing the number of low-income units, or narrowing the income
range of residents classified as low-income or by subsidization of land
prices to bring the total cost of construction within reasonable limits.
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Table III-d. MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE MORTGAGE LIMITS - 235 and 236*
Section 235 Max. Mortgage - $15,000 - 3 Bedrooms $18,000 - 4 Bedrooms or more
Section 236 Unit
Eff. Apartment
1 Bedroom
2 Bedrooms
3 Bedrooms
4 Bedrooms (or more),
*Taken from:
Walk-up Structure
$9,200
12,937
15,525
19,550
22,137
Region III HUD Regional Office - Atlanta, Georgia - Guidelines for 236 & 235 Housing.
Elevator
$10,925
15,525
18,400
23,000
26,132
Table III-e. CONSTRUCTION~ COST AVERAGES ( EXCLUSIVE OF LAND) CHAPEL HILL-ORANGE COUNTY*
Public Housing
& Turnky
Cost/ft
20
15.20
13.80
12.30
11.10
10.10
I
Unit Cost
8,000
8,938
9,700
11,920
12,800.
13,700
Turnkey II
Cos /ft2
21.30
16.10
13.80
12.85
11.40
10.40
I
Unit Cost
8,500
9,438
10,200
12,420
13,300
14,200'
Section 236
Cos/ft2 Unit Cost
14.69
12.46
10.73
10.18
9.09
7.79
Section 2235
Cosi/ft Unit Cost
5,876
7,326
7,554
9,854
10,617
10,656
8,000
9,200
10,400
*Taken from: Unpublished Report:
Taylor & Coble - UNC
Low-Income Housing Study: Chapel Hi
School of City and Regional Planning
11-Orange County,
Table III-f. AVERAGE LAND COST PER UNIT (MULTI-FAMILY HOUSING FOR CHAPEL HILL-ORANGE COUNTY*
Econ. Neighborhood
Cos t
Low-Income
$700
Moderate Income
$850
Middle Income
$1,100
High Income
$1,600
* As above.
No. of
Bedrooms
0
1
2
3
4
5
I
HILL-ORANGE COUNTY*CONSTRUCTION COST AVERAGES (EXCLUSIVE OF LAND) CHAPELTable III-s.o
Table III-g. AVERAGE LOT COST FOR SINGLE-FAMILY DWELLING FOR CHAPEL HILL-ORANGE COUNTY*
Econ. Neighborhood
Cost
Low Income
$2,375
Moderate Income
$3,000
Middle Income
$5,000
High Income
$7,500
.*Taken from: Unpublished Report: Low-Income Housing Study: Chapel Hill-Orange County,
Taylor and Coble - UNC School of City and Regional Planning.
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Table III-h. PROJECTED COST OF MULTI-FAMILY UNITS (SECTION 236) SOUL CITY
No. of Beds Unit Cost Land Cost (Avg.) Total Cost* Max. Statutory
5,876
7,326
7,554
9,854
10,617
10,656
935
935
935
935
935
935
6,811
8,261
8,489
10,789
11,552
11,591
9,200
12,937
15,525
19,550
22,137
*Note: Total cost does not include fees for closing, legal fees, title insurance, etc.
**Taken from: Maximum Mortgage Limits, which includes fees for closing, legal fees, title insurance, etc.
Table III-i. PROJECTED COST OF SINGLE-FAMILY UNITS (SECTION 235) SOUL CITY
kLn
No. of Beds Unit Cost Land Cost Total Cost* Max. Statutory Linits**
3
4
8,000
9,200
5 10,400
0
1
2
3
4
5
Limits* *
3,300
3,300
3,300
11,300
12,500
13,700
15,000
18,000
18,000
Summary of the Housing Plan
The guidelines suggested in the previous sections illustrate the amount
of analysis I think is needed in the planning stages in order to effec-
tively get a feasible program for housing. (Although low-income users
were used as the example, it seems clear that the same kind of analysis
may be called for in considering other housing.) Although such a syste-
matic analysis may entail tremendous economic costs to the developer,
the investment may prove to be worthwhile at a later date when the
feasibility of developing in Soul City becomes a crucial factor for
potential sub-developers. If the prime developer can thoroughly sub-
stantiate his belief in the market potential by showing a systematic
and thoroughly researched set of facts, he is likely to minimize the
perceived risks of sub-developers, who at the outset, do not possess
the adequate information.
Of itself the housing plan should reveal critical issues that may need
assessment by the prime developer before land is put up for sale.
Although the analysis of potential low-income markets can only be a
general indication of the location, composition, and probable size of
families, this information coupled with the prime developer's staging
of other users in the town can give some positive direction in terms of
what housing is likely to be needed first. Finding the correct "fit"
of housing to the incoming population is crucial to the developer in
terms of evidencing a brisk pace of sales, and establishing an aura of
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success and 'credibility with potential other users. The implications
for a town like Soul City are even more critical, where a diverse low-
income population with different problems of acculturation to the new
environment might create tension and friction if the wrong choices are
made on housing mix. Thus, if the analysis of the market can show that
in years one to six the population is likely to be heavily black and
rural, with family compositions ranging from couples to families with
young children, then a heavy emphasis on mid-rise apartment development
during those development years may be a social and marketing mistake the
developer is not likely to make if his market findings are correct. The
housing plan should also offer some clues to the design of a land deve-
lopment strategy. Key elements contributing to how land should be
handled are related to density requirements and land sales prices
related to the expected return on investment.
Implications for Land Development
It obviously is not enough to arbitrarily set an ultimate gross density
for residential development without relating this density to land sale
proceeds. The previous discussion (Table II-c.) on unit sales prices
of land for low-income housing seems to indicate that land costs may be
unfeasible. As an alternative, the developer may have to consider higher
densities of development to reduce unit sales cost. From another view-
point, the analysis of the market may indicate a preference for more
multi-family units, which may also imply higher density development.
Higher density development, if signalled by the findings, may result in
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some savings in infrastructure cost to the prime developer. It may also
be a liability, in terms of the political negotiations that may be
required to convince governmental agencies, (in this case Warren County),
if there happens to be serious conflicts with these zoning ordinances.
A second alternative open to the prime developer, if higher densities,
cannot be utilized as a means of' bringing unit cost of land within limits,
is the creation of inflated land values by scattered site development.
To maintain a "quota" of land for low-income developers the price of land
may have to be adjusted downward to induce development. This reduction
in price might well be offset by judicious holding of land "off the
market" for future development at a higher land price. Scattered site
development necessarily implies greater initial capital outlays by the
prime developer in infrastructure cost, and if scatteration is not
handled in a sophisticated fashion, it may also give the appearance of
"incompleteness." Nevertheless, the increased cost of undeveloped parcels
may well pay benefits at a future date that will cover the cost implied
by such a strategy.
Scattered site development makes even more sense when you consider
Objective #2 calling for dispersal of housing to eliminate large sub-
divisions of economically homogeneous groups. By using a checkerboard
pattern, a finer grain of development will occur (i.e. small pockets of
housing development over varying income ranges). The checkerboard or
scattered site strategy enhances the chances of small builders buying~
small parcels which could encourage indigenous developers, while forcing
larger builders to build over a wider area on non-continuous parcels.
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The final alternative for reducing unfeasible land prices may involve
outright subsidies by the prime developer to developers of low-income
housing, or an overall reduction in residential land prices, by increasing
the price of land to other users (possibly industrial users). In all
likelihood, some combination of all of the above land development strate-
gies may be used by the prime developer.
The Housing Plan, as I pose it, can never be more than a general guide
for action. It is not a static device, for it will require constant up-
dating and readjustment as marketing data and other factors continually
change. But as a guide for development, it can allow the developer to
assess necessary actions that may have to be taken to bring about reso-
lution with the overall objectives and goals for Soul City development.
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CHAPTER IV. CONTROLLING THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
In reality, a sound housing plan, supported by reliable market data, and
a viable strategy for land development, may be a meaningless policy, if
the prime developer fails to recognize the limitations, opportunities,
and devices at his disposal to bring about effective implementation of
the physical city. The key actors in the process of implementation of
housing are the prime developer, as a seller of land; the sub-developer,
as a buyer and builder of housing; and residents, as the users and final
consumers of housing. Somewhere during the pre-implementation stage the
prime developer must evaluate what his relationship to the other two
actors should be, in order to facilitate a development pattern consis-
tent with the aforestated goals and objectives.
When McKissick was asked about the devices and options available to him
as the prime developer to control land development, he was quick to
point to his master plan or other proposed planning documents. There
seems to be an almost religious reliance on written documents (economic
model, master plan, zoning ordinance, etc.) as the key devices to control
impending development. The danger, in my opinion, is that such documents
may be seen as rigorously structured blueprints for building, rather than
as general parameters or guidelines of intent, and that to exert control
solely by depending on them may be impossible without reliance on other
factors.
I. DEFINITION OF CONTROL
Before proceeding further, let me develop a definition for "control" as
I see it in the context of land development in a planned new town.
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Consider a situation where two parties are engaged in some form of
discourse, and party "A", as initiator or promoter of an idea, concept,
or program, tries to engage the services of party "B", in order to
further some desired ends in advancing his concept, idea or program.
Party "B", by definition, may be considered an adversary of "A", since
his tendency is to resist conforming to "A" until "A" pays a price either
in re-defining the task, or restiructuring the concept to fit "B"'s needs.
I would then define "control" as the ability of Party "A"l to get party "B"
to perform, in support of his idea, concept or program, at little cost
to "A" in the way of dilution of the original concept. Factors affecting
the relationship between "A" and "B" primarily depend on (1) what "B" is
asked to do, (2) "B"'s faith and respect for "A", and (3) "B"'s assess-
ment of his gains vs. losses if he chooses to perform.
The above definition in the context of a planned housing environment,
would suggest that control is essentially the ability of the prime
developer (Party "A"l) to negotiate, cajole, or even bribe other sub-
developers (Party "B") to promulgate his program for housing into
reality with a minimum amount of dilution or distortion.
In retrospect, McKissick (as Party "A'' by definition) must recognize that
long before he gets to the stage of dealing with sub-developers, his
original concept will in all probability be altered considerably by
numerous other actors (Party "B"'s) who will have an interest in Soul
City. In all likelihood he will be unable to change laws or alter speci-
fic government regulations relating to land development, neither will he
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be completely able to re-orient conservative investment and banking
principles, or even counter the hard-nose advice of experts and consul-
tants. All of these actors (government agencies, financial backers, and
professional experts) will play a role in manipulating and re-molding
the original concept for Soul City.- In effect, the prime developer's
control over the project becomes diffused almost in direct proportion to
the number of new actors involved in the process.
The paradigm does not change at the brink of implementation. If the
developer has somehow survived the preliminary planning and funding
stages, he cannot assume that his by now "revised" concept is "home free."
The new set of actors in the process are likely to be more vociferous
adversaries than those already encountered, since their involvement in
the town may spell the difference between solvency and bankruptcy, and
also because long range tenure implies long range vital interests. Thus,
the sub-developers, commercial and industrial users, and even residents
will represent new challenges, for each will see Soul City as representing
a unique set of opportunities and constraints which may be at variance
with the set of goals internalized by the prime developer.
II. SUB-DEVELOPER VS. PRIME DEVELOPER
The implementation process for housing in Soul City ostensibly will
commence with the sale of land to sub-developers (firms, individuals, or
groups), who in turn build housing, which is then marketed to consumers
(residents of Soul City.)
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In the usual scenario involving real estate transactions, the seller of
property is primarily interested in maximizing his profits in the market-
place. In the case of a planned community, the seller, if he is prime
developer, has an additional motivation to insure that the potential
buyer (sub-developer) utilizes his newly acquired property in a pre-
scribed manner. Planning documents are used to convey the seller's
intent. They range from comprehensive master plans to detailed parcel
plans specifying such things as floor area ratio, building type, and even
potential users.
The prime developer usually requires that a legally binding agreement
(deed covenant) be signed by the sub-developer which stipulates that the
property or parcel be developed in accordance with the planning documents.
Although such a deed covenant will be in conformance with existing govern-
mental codes and regulations regarding development, a significant portion
of the requirements will represent the values and concepts of the prime
developer, who as a private entity cannot be said to be a representative
of any governmental agency acting in the interest of "the public good."
(This is not the case with deed covenants signed by sub-developers of
urban renewal property who recognize the validity of the local govern-
ment agency acting for the public welfare.) Thus, the sub-developers
may feel no compunction to submissively comply with all the stipulations
of the deed covenant, primarily because he recognizes the prime developer
as another private party motivated by many of the same factors that he
himself is interested in. Furthermore, he may conclude that given this
likeness in motivation, he may have a better chance to bargain with the
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prime developer to minimize the perceived risks inherent in (1) venturing
into Soul City as an investor and (2) building according to the specified
plans. McKissick in this case may have need at this point to strengthen
his bargaining position by reliance on factors that are external to the
specific planning documents. These factors are elaborated below:
1. Prestige* - The prime developer's position in bargaining
is immediately enhanced if the sub-developer perceives that
the prime developer's credentials are of the first order.
This presumes that the prime's previous track record in such
ventures was successful and highly regarded by peers. Such
is not the case with McKissick, but he does have the option
of "borrowing prestige" from other sources. Thus, if
McKissick can show that his project has been endorsed by a
James Rouse, or a Bill Levitt, or the Chase-Manhattan Bank,
this may be convincing evidence to persuade a potential
sub-developer of the project's feasibility and soundness.
2. Quality of Information - Market data, engineering
analyses, and other information used for supportive evidence,
can also minimize the risks to the sub-developer. For
McKissick to systematically, rather than arbitrarily, show
how the plan evolved, may be important to rational-minded
businessmen who must weigh the consequences between profit
and loss, based on information which they do not previously
possess.
3. Political Savvy - If the prime developer's political
connections are of the first magnitude, the sub-developer
may understand this to mean that the prime may be a useful
ally in dealing with financial institutions, or government
funding agencies. The implication is that McKissick should
have sources at high enough places in government (federal,
state, local) and financial circles, to allow him to command
enough influence to insure favorable action for the sub-
developers of his housing program.
4. Choice of Sub-Developer - Probably the most useful
device for insuring compliance is for McKissick to choose
those developers most in agreement with the stated goals
and objectives. This, however, would imply some knowledge
of the potential sub-developers and their unique characte-
ristics. (I submit that the judicious choice of sub-
developers is central to the whole implementation process,
and as such, will be discussed in depth in succeeding chapters.)
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Even in utilizing all of the above four options, there is the possibility
that subs will still decline to comply. McKissick may be forced to
surrender concessions or make compromises to get compliance. In some
cases, he may have to undertake building directly, thus becoming his own
sub-developer. In all cases, his ability to make concessions, or become
his own sub-developer are dependent on his own peculiar financial position
during specific stages of the development period.
The planning documents that McKissick regards so highly may not be enough
to control the actions of the sub-developers. They may even become a
liability if they are not designed with enough flexibility 'to allow some
"gray areas" for negotiation. For if the prime developer is locked into
a "frozen" position by his plans and is forced to retreat significantly
the very 2ct of retreating may place him in a weak bargaining position
in dealing with other potential actors at a future date.
A mechanism by which each segment of the land use plan is designed to
cover a range of possible uses, rather than specific designations
encourages flexibility, i.e. by stipulating a density range for a speci-
fic area along with general design rules with regard to massing and use
of materials, the developer allows himself some room for input by sub-
developers. Furthermore, the use of general rules as opposed to
specific rules and designations encourages an open-ended approach to
master planning, allowing the prime developer the opportunity to develop
and design a contingency mechanism for up-dating and changing the plan.
Finally, the sub-developers, recognizing the flexibility and chance for
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input, are likely to be encouraged by the opportunity to display their
ingenuity and experience, thus to some degree eliminating the subordinate
relationship that is inherent in relying on an immutable master plan.
So the relationship between the prime developer and sub-developer may
indeed hinge on the degree of flexibility of the planning documents, but
also on external factors relating to prestige, experience, political
know-how, and the prime developer's ability to discern the strengths and
weaknesses of various sub-developer types.
III. RESIDENTS VS. PRIME DEVELOPER
Even assuming that the prime developer is able to effectively utilize
sub-developers to further his aims, what are his likely problems as the
first town residents start moving in? How can he reconcile his need to
control the development process, with the incoming residents' expecta-
tions of community control and participation in key issues?. What are
the likely problems in advanced stages of development when presumably
residents will have reached such critical numbers that they desire legal
incorporation and an elected town government?
In discussing his role in the development, with respect to that of the
incoming residents and permanent residents, McKissick cites three basic
2
obligations that he must fulfill. The first, is an obligation to
investors and financial backers who placed their faith in a twenty-year
comprehensive development plan and expect some specific rate of return.
The second obligation is largely a personal motivation to carry through
on his original concept thereby fulfilling his need to know if the city,
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as he envisions it, has any validity. Finally, McKissick feels obligated
to the new town residents, and believes that he must insure the develop-
ment of a strong and vital environemnt where "free expression, opportunity,
and racial harmony" are the rules rather than the exception. I am not at
all sure how McKissick's perceived obligation to residents of Soul City
correlates with his first two obligations, both of which imply a tightly
controlled, "from the top," planning and development process.
The fact is that all three obligations, whether real or perceived, are
based on rather static and fixed assumptions about Soul City. When is
Soul City a City? Is it when the twenty-year development period is over?
Is it when the first residents arrive? Is it when the profit expectations
have been realized? Or, is it when some critical population has been
reached? I can offer no reasonable answer to any of these questions, but
seemingly if McKissick Enterprises can view the town as a dynamic,
evolving process rather than a fixed environmental end-state, some of the
answers to the apparent conflict between prime developer and residents
may be resolved.
For example, by selling the financial institutions and investors on a
comprehensive plan, the developer boxes himself into a position (similar to the
one described in dealing with sub-developers) where he has little flexi-
bility. But, if the investors were sold an idea, or a process of
development, albeit with some projected financial return, the developer
is allowed some room to manuever, to create, to gain or surrender ground,
etc., without feeling constrained by specific documents.
For the developer to simplistically take the position that as initiator
of the ideq.the town must be built "in his own image" seemingly invites
conflicts from all directions. Despite his professed interest in social
welfare goals, the prime developer may find that considerable tension
may be built up between him and the residents. A more laudable position
,by the prime developer is to see his role as ever changing, i.e. in the
early stages as a protector of the interests of future residents from
the possible excesses of the first dwellers (or pioneers) -- in later
years as a founding father, highly influential and respected, but main-
taining a low profile in his exercise of power, and in fact, divesting
himself of that power gradually as the town grows and development
approaches "completion." In both cases, McKissick may be quite effective
in getting his desired results, but rather than do it from a position
"above the community," he does it as a "part of the community."
The relationship with residents should, from the outset, be open and
candid. Clearly residents must be made to understand before settling
what limitations and restrictions are contingent upon location in
Soul City. They should further be educated, (possibly by making the
developer's decision-making process highly visible), to the level of
understanding the developer's unique situation, both with respect to
financial and development issues. But being candid with residents is
only a first step. McKissick should clearly define specific time-tables
during the development stages where residents begin to take over signi-
ficant control. It may not be improbable that community control and
participation may nec essarily be token during the initial years.
But, because of the unique social objectives set down by the prime
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developer, a significant amount of attraction to the town will be because
it purports to be a town offering residents participation, and a voice
in the control of their environment. As such, it is the developer's
responsibility to describe. how and when that element of the town's pro-
gram will be implemented, if for no other reason than to minimize
frustration and expectations from the new citizenry.
Such a time-table might state, that in initial years of development,
locating residents will have control over only their immediate environ-
ment (housing area). This control might be defined as some vote in
maintenance and management issues, or voice in policy-making with regard
to rental increases, etc. The time-table might also stipulate that in
developed areas, some form of representative government would decide key
issues relating to community problems. But, in areas not yet developed,
existing residents may be allowed to participate in developmental
decisions, but be allowed no vote. Such a time-table for the early years
might conceivably be reasonable, since it allows some control over the
"environment" closest to the resident. By opening up the development
decision-making process, but allowing no votes to existing residents, the
developer circumvents the possibility that a very small core population
might control the direction of a town planned for 50,000 people. How-
ever, as the town grows, as institutions develop to maturity, the
time-table should define new powers and areas of control for residents.
Much of this participation and control by residents will result from
power devolved from the prime developer, but some will come through
ownership or sale directly to community groups and individuals.
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To summarize: the relationship between developer and residents is
largely dependent on the role the developer perceives he must play in
the town's growth to maturity. There is a middle ground that resolves
the conflict of absolute control by the prime developer and community
participation by the town's residents. That middle ground may be found,
if the city can be viewed as a process of evolution and if the developer
can maintain a candid, open and flexible relationship with incoming, and
permanent residents.
IW. SUMMARY
Control, then, as I visualize it, is not in any way an absolute, well-
defined process in the context of a private developer getting other
actors to do what he wants by fiat. There is no magic formula which
can be carted out to solve specific problems. Master plans, parcel
development plans, data, etc., can only be used as supporting devices
to delineate intent. They are not sanctioned by law, they cannot be
imposed, and they only represent the value judgements of one particular
party. Prestige, influence, flexibility, and knowledge cannot in them-
selves be the developer's sole means of gaining effective control.
However, if the control issue can be internalized as a bargaining pro-
cess where concessions and compromises are made, and where the final
outcome is measured by the amount of concessions given up by one party
to the other, then the above factors may be important to the degree
that they establish a strong negotiating position for the prime deve-
loper.
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Because I see the sub-developer as the key actor in the implementation
process, the remaining chapters of this thesis are devoted to analyzing
the nature of such developers with the intent that McKissick, in order
to maximize his bargaining position, must be thoroughly cognizant of
the characteristics and peculiarities of each.
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CHAPTER V. POTENTIAL SUB-DEVELOPERS FOR SOUL CITY HOUSING
I have suggested in previous chapters that the sub-developers of housing
represent a critical group of actors in the implementation process. The
aforestated objectives defining the scope of the housing program, the
housing plan and the strategy for land development all go for naught if
the sub-developer's role in development is not completely understood by
the prime developer. Highly idealized objectives relating to self-help
housing or indigenous construction training programs may be made inoperable
if there are no willing sub-developers ready to undergo the inherent risks
involved. A scattered site land development strategy may equally fall
apart if the prime developer fails to internalize the inherent diffi-
culties that would hinder certain sub-developers. Industrialized
housing may be ridiculous if there are no builders willing to change
over to that approach. And community corporations to build housing may
be non-existent if the developer is not aware of their special needs.
It is conceivable that substantial concessions may have to be made to
one kind of sub-developer related to degree of "control," financing, or
in land sales price. On the other hand, another sub-developer may require
no technical or financial support, but may be so restricted in his ability
to produce the desired product that he may be useless to the prime.
Issues related to tenant management, ownership, and community partici-
pation may well vary with the peculiarities of the sub-developer. A
builder of rental housing with a long-range investment outlook may
afford little opportunity for community participation in management,
while a builder of housing for ownership by consumers is likely to
present no such problems in this regard.
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I submit that knowledge of the potential sub-developers with respect to
their goals, value orientation, mode of operation, profit motivation,
etc., may be a valid approach to assessing the operability of the
housing objectives, and its contingent plans. By determining each sub-
developer's value to the city's development, and likewise their need for
Soul City's opportunities, the prime developer can work backward to make
adjustments to his overall plan to conform with the necessary require-
ments.
It is to McKissick's credit that he has been able to identify at least
five potential sub-developer types for housing development. Carey and
Tolbert of McKissick's staff agreed that the five types (Type II and
Type VII were added by me) described below were most likely to want to
purchase land in Soul City.1
They are:
Type I - The merchant builder
Type II - Small indigenous home builder
Type III - The housing development company
Type IV - Nationally or regionally based non-profit housing
foundations
Type V - Indigenous community developers of housing (non-profit
and limited profit)
Type VI - Joint ventures between McKissick and any one of the above
Type VII - Public housing agency
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In setting up a typology, the factors that I systematically wanted to
consider for each potential sub-developer are listed below:
1. The technical capability to produce housing;
2. The administrative and management ability to expedite
development;
3. Sources of financing;
4. Expected profit or investment outlook;
5. Social welfare orientation.
Because of the limited time and resources, I was unable to study each
developer type in the degree or depth I would recommend to McKissick in
the event of real implementation. My primary purpose however, is to
identify only those salient differences and peculiarities of each deve-
loper type, hoping that as examples, they focus on issues and actions
that the prime developer must take to bring about effective implementation.2
Type I. - The Merchant Builder
The merchant builder represents that group of producers of housing,
organized to acquire land, build houses (predominantly single-family) and
sell directly to individual consumers. Their building operation has
largely been on-site construction, although significant progress has
been made in the 1960's toward pre-fabricated building of components at
a central place with shipments to the site for assembly.3 The merchant
builder has accounted for more than two-thirds of all the single-family
housing produced since World War II. Of the average total housing pro-
duction in the sixties, merchant builders accounted for better than 60%
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of all conventionally built single-family houses built in the United States.
And yet there are not many large-scale merchant builders (more than 200
houses/year), the industry being characterized by a number of small
builders. The fifty largest producers accounted for no more than 15% of
the annual housing production. The largest of these was Levitt and Sons,
which produced 5,100 units in 1967. The key distinction between the mer-
chant builder and the custom home builder is the fact that merchant
builders build speculatively, and usually on a larger scale, than custom
builders who build for a specific client.
Technical capability: The merchant builder predominantly specializes in
the single-family housing type. His success with this type has largely
been due to economies of scale, and his ability to bring under a single
firm all of the necessary factors for housing production-assembly of
land, site improvements, design, construction and sales. In the single-
family house, he chooses a variety of set designs (many times the same
floor plans with minimal variation in elevation) and depends on the
repetitive use of these designs to bring about an efficient mass produc-
tion technique at the site. All of these factors have allowed the merchant
builder to produce a final product well within the income ranges of many
American home buyers.5
McKissick, then, in assessing the merchant builder's technical capacity
must bear in mind that, on the average, they are restricted to expertise
in the development of a single housing type. Furthermore, the average
merchant builder (30-150 houses/year) may probably be quite unwilling to
-74-
try "new" approaches in design or construction, unless the front-end cost
of re-tooling their present technique can be made profitable. The inflexi-
bility I infer here is not total over the whole industry, since very large
firms with a full complement of architectural services, or with sufficient
capital and track record may be able to afford the price of innovation.
Administrative and management ability: The merchant builder, upon buying
land, tends to completely control all aspects of development until the
housing is sold to the consumer. In most cases, the in-house staff con-
sists of a group of managers or professional types disciplined in real
estate, land management, engineering, and sales. Larger firms staff, in
addition, comptroller-s, accountants, economic planners and financial
analysts, and sometimes a full-scale architectural staff. Most merchant
builders utilizing conventional construction techniques, will maintain
only a skeleton crew for construction, preferring to sub-contract for
heating, plumbing, or electrical services. The size of the firm is a
clear indicator of the degree of specialization for each firm. In many
small firms the chief executive officer may wear the hat of many disci-
plines. Such is the case with two small builders that I observed in
North and South Carolina.
The H. A. DeCosta Company, a black-owned builder of housing in
Charleston, South Carolina operates from a small office of 1,500 square
feet. Mr. DeCosta, the principal owner, and president of the company,
plays the multiple roles of broker, land developer, engineer and con-
struction superintendent. His chief assistant performs as an architect,
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salesman, and accountant. The total staff is made up of a small skeleton
crew of carpenters and masons, two draftsmen and two secretaries. For
special supporting services such as legal advice and financial planning,
DeCosta uses outside firms. He maintains a core group of sub-contractors
to support his construction work crew. In a good year (i.e. 1965),
DeCosta has built as many as sixty single-family houses in the $16,000-
$35,000 range. This is his specialty. In poorer years they build
custom homes and bid for small apartment and commercial jobs.
The John Thomasson Company, a small white-owned builder located in
Charlotte, North Carolina operates in a similar fashion to DeCosta.
However, rather than merchandise his houses directly, he joint ventures
with a real estate brokerage house to eliminate that particular task
from his work load. Thomasson averages eighty houses/year in the $35,000-
$60,000 price range. His skeleton construction crew include tile setters,
carpenters, mason, and millwork, and is in general larger than the DeCosta
work force. Thomasson also has financial interests in local building
materials firms.
Ervin Construction Company of Charlotte is a giant merchant builder (by
southern standards). Their headquarters is a twelve-story office
building, which houses a complete staff of professionals to handle all
the various disciplines for development. In this case, Charles Ervin,
chief executive officer and chairman of the board, is mainly a policy
maker and public relations officer for his firm. Because of the firm's
size and its use of large sums of capital, firms like Ervin have direct
connections with financial institutions in obtaining funds for construction
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(Charles Ervin is a board member of one major bank and two savings and
loan associations). The Ervin firm is regionally based, building in North
and South Carolina, Virginia and Georgia. Their annual housing production
averages close to 2,000 units per year, and in the Charlotte area they
have been responsible for well over half the new houses built since 1960.6
Firms like Ervin are quite capable of building other housing types in
addition to the single-family house, and in recent years they have been
specializing in "planned communities," (which are housing developments
of multi-family units and ancillary commercial shopping areas).
To summarize, the merchant builder, whether large or small, given a
reasonable track record, seems to be intricately familiar with the area
of housing development, due to the monolithic or semi-monolithic control
over all of the required aspects. Thus the economic cost to McKissick
would seem to be minimum. I sense that once land is sold, and an agree-
ment is reached on utilization, the merchant builder would require little
other assistance.
Sources of funding: The merchant builder has need for two kinds of
financing: (1) funds to underwrite the cost of land acquisition and site
improvements; and (2) interim construction funds to pay for materials,
labor and overhead during the actual construction of housing.7 The
availability of funds is directly a function of the size and track record
of the individual developer. Financially well-off builders oftentimes
utilize their profits from previous ventures to acquire new land or
support construction.
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Funds to support land acquisitions have only recently been made available
8
by savings and loan associations, and only on a short-run basis. Tradi-
tional banking institutions, however, are still reluctant in most cases
to make loans to acquire new raw land. One source of funding, however,
has been the ad-hoc syndication, where builders invite investors to put
up the money for land, with the promise of returning a handsome profit
once the houses are sold. The purchase-money mortgage has also been
utilized (by DeCosta and Thomasson), the arrangement being installment
payments to the seller over a period of time as the houses are sold.
In most cases, the merchant builder requires the use of land funds over
a period of three to five years, which allows for site development, con-
struction, and sales.
Interim construction financing is usually sought from banks, savings
and loans, and other traditional institutional lenders. The loans
9
usually amount to 75% to 80% of the projected sale price. It is repaid
after the sale of each house, and is usually very risky but highly pro-
fitable to the lender. The builder is constantly looking for the best
lenders in terms of service, interest rates, fees and size of loans,
since the added cost to the house due to financing may raise the sales
price so significantly that it might make marketing difficult.
The merchant builder must often deal with federal agencies for financing
committments. Those builders of multi-family subsidized units (Ervin)
have the need of assuring that federal insurance is available. Those
single-family home builders (of Section 235 housing for low-income
families, or the standard VA and FHA housing) need to assure that their
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projects meet certain standards and that federal insurance will be made
available for their potential consumers. Because the merchant builder
sells directly to the consumer, he is always in competition to lure the
consumer dollar through attractive financing packages. This often means
VA or FHA loans, which often require complex, time-consuming dealings
with federal agencies. Firms like Ervin, hire full-time personnel whose
sole job is to cultivate a working rapport with the government agencies
to speed the application process and eliminate the red tape. Smaller
firms like DeCosta and Thomasson cannot afford such personnel and in
most cases, they try to minimize dependence on federal sources, preferring
to channel their clients through the speedier, conventional financing
route.
To summarize, the smaller merchant builder may experience more difficulty
in finding funds for land acquisition and interim financing, possibly
because he may lack the financial solvency to acquire large enough amounts
at reasonable rates. Thus he may pay more on financing costs. It is not
likely that any substantial proportion of his profits can be plowed back
into new ventures. The very opposite is true of larger builders, who
can acquire funds in large amounts at lower interest rates, and thereby
reduce the per unit cost attributed to financing. Their ability to
deploy sizeable sums of capital from profits back into new ventures also
minimizes their need of outside financial sources. Finally, in presenting
a financial package to the consumer, the larger merchant builders can
afford to utilize the various subsidy programs, with lower interest rates,
as a marketing mechanism because the cost to them in time and overhead
is minimized by his "connections" with the various agencies.
-79-
Profit and investment outlook: The sale of single-family houses is the
chief source of profit for themerchant builder. The quicker the sale,
the greater the profit, because of the reduced carrying charges on land
and construction. Other very minor forms of profit derive from main-
tenance of community recreational facilities, laundromats, and other
ancillary services.
This emphasis on the quick sale directly to the consumer is a clue to
the builder's investment outlook. The me'rchant builder is concerned
chiefly with the short-term possibilities for profit. His assessment of
project possibilities is contingent on the factor of immediacy -- i.e.,
the marketability of his product over a one-to-three-year period. If he
has been successful with a particular housing type or mode of operation
in previous ventures, he is not likely to want to tamper with success.
In the case of Soul City the long-range goals of the town are wont to be
of little concern, unless he has tied up capital in land options for
later development.
The provision of ancillary services or "frills" depends heavily on the
characteristics of the target market, and are provided solely to enhance
the sale of housing, and not out of some motivation related to amenity
and esthetics. Thus, the merchant builder as the short-run investor
will have no long-range committment to the success or failure of Soul City.
This fact may be significant in the way the prime developer may choose
to utilize him.
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Social welfare orientation: The above discussion on profits seems to
indicate that as a business organization, the merchant builder is not
primarily motivated toward solving pressing social issues through
housing. While they have satisfied the housing needs of the large
middle class, little enthusiasm has been evident for producing housing
at the lower echelons of the housing market. (Part of the problem is
related to the margin of profit inherent in producing a $25,000 house
as opposed to a $12,000 house.)
One of the major goals in Soul City's development program is the
utilization of unskilled indigenous laborers for construction work.
There are indications that merchant builders may be somewhat reluctant
to use large inexperienced crews. John Thomasson indicated that although
he has trained a significant number of previously unskilled workers over
a period of years in small increments, he would be unwilling to take
them on in large numbers over a short time span. He feels that large
percentages of such workers at any one time reduces efficiency, decreases
the overall quality of workmanship and thus weakens his competitive posi-
tion in the marketplace. He further elaborated that, in the case of
Soul City, his only obligation, once he has acquired land, should be to
build housing as efficiently as possible for a specific housing market,
and any stipulations that tampered with his mode of operation would
appreciably dampen his interest in developing in the area.
The views of Thomasson are not exceptional for merchant builders of that
size. A larger builder like Ervin is able to absorb unskilled laborers
in large numbers more readily. The reasons being the need for laborers
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given the volume of construction, the fairly high attrition or turnover
rate of workers that create continuing vacancies, and the general shift
to off-site fabrication with its inherent assembly line techniques that-
lend more readily to the training of unskilled workers.
To summarize, the merchant builder is not likely to be strongly oriented
'to social welfare goals. Efforts at fostering job training programs may
be possible, depending on the size of the developer, but even then the
developer will cooperate only if such programs are profitable or fit the
required needs of their firms.
Type II. - Potential Small Home Builder
This sub-developer refers to local craftsmen who are skilled in house
construction, but are primarily employed in larger construction firms,
or either unemployed or under-employed. They are presently an unorganized
entity, but given the opportunity, they may be quite willing to organize
for the construction of housing on a small scale. Although the small home
builder was not formally identified by McKissick as a potential developer,
I've taken the liberty to add them to this typology, because I feel they
represent a potential resource for housing development in addition to
furthering other goals related to economic opportunity for indigenous
groups. Many of the observations made here are based on an informal con-
versation I had with Duncan McNeil of McKissick Enterprises. 1 0
Technical Capability: According to McNeil, the seven-county area
surrounding Soul City has produced an extraordinary number of brick masons
and carpenters who have been largely trained in vocational schools (run by
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the state) but have either left the region for job opportunities in the
major population centers, or remain in the area working for construction
companies, and construction related industries.1 Aside from the fact
that opportunities in the Warren County area for construction have almost
been non-existent, the potential small builder has traditionally faced two
other factors that have tended to inhibit their organization as builders:
(1) the N.C. licensing examination for contractors; (2) the minimum
bonding requirement of $75,000.12
However, given the opportunity, the small-home builder is likely to be at
ease with the single-family house of minimum complication. With his basic
skills in masonry, carpentry, etc., he may only have to sub-contract for
the mechanical trades (much like their larger counterpart -- the small
merchant builder). McNeil feels that such home builders with a work
force of twelve to fifteen men in a 2:1 ratio of laborer-trainees-to-
skilled workers, could produce some ten to fifteen houses per year in
small scale development. Multi-family housing, with its more sophisticated
construction techniques, would presumably not be feasible in initial
ventures for such sub-developers.
Administrative ability: The small potential homebuilder is probably
weakest in his ability to administer development. He has probably had
little or no experience in dealing with real estate brokers, financial
institutions or government bureaucracies. Although he may implicitly
realize the value of time, money, and efficiency, his lack of business
know-how may seriously hinder him in proper scheduling, accounting, and
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job supervision. He may require outside professional help, but may avoid
this route if capital resources are insufficient to cover the cost of such
services. (Administrative difficulties among small builders is cited as
one of the prime reasons for the high rate of failure by these firms. 13
The prime developer must then recognize that small builders are primarily
craftsmen, and not businessmen, and unless they can be supported by
outside counselling on business procedures, at best they will be slow
inefficient developers, and at worst, short-term failures.
Funding sources: The kind of funds needed by the small builder are not
unlike those needed by the merchant builder. The difficulty in securing
these funds are infinitely greater though. The small builder has no
notable track record, evidences no overwhelming business acumen, or
reasonable net worth. Thus, financial institutions are most reluctant
to venture capital with him. Federal sources like Small Business Admini-
stration (SBA) although chartered to help small businesses, use almost
the same criteria for evaluation of the small builder as the traditional
lenders. The fact that the financial community is cognizant of the "easy"
entry of firms into construction and their corresponding high attrition
rate does not help the case for the potential small home builder.
Profit and investment outlook: The source of profit for the small builder
(like the merchant builder) is derived from the sale of the single-family
house. Although in reality he is a short-run investor, the fact that he
is a "local" builder, subject to the daily judgments on the quality of
his work by his peers,. he is likely to internalize his production of
housing as a long-range investment in the community.
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Social Welfare Orientation: Although profit-motivated, as local citizens,
such builders are likely to be quite receptive to social issues in the
community than their counterpart merchant builders. Thus, training of
indigenous unskilled workers might conceivably be welcomed especially
since these builders have not presumably formed strong cohesive work crews.
The very existence of the small homebuilder represents a socially
desirable goal in itself. The symbol of economic mobility may be helpful
in motivating others in the area to seek similar opportunity.
Type III. - The Housing Development Company
Organizations or firms, whose major purpose is the investment in real
estate ventures of housing development will be called (in this typology)
housing development companies (HDC's). Although there is little evidence
related to the origin of HDC's in this country, I would suspect that syn-
dicates of investors in income-producing property go back to colonial
days. The real hey-days of the real estate syndicates occurred during
the boom years of the twenties when investment capital was plentifully
supplied by "artificially" wealthy individuals seeking to diversify their
investment portfolios away from securities and into real property. The
syndicates suffered severely during the depression years of the thirties,
and has only recently been on the upswing again in the late fifties and
sixties.1
The typical housing development company today start off as real estate
managers and brokers. They evolve into development firms engaging in
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the acquisition of real property in order to improve, sell, or hold for
investment purposes, or to increase the income-producing capability.
With the added incentive of favorable tax and depreciation laws individual
investors have been attracted to the real estate market partially because
of the potential lucrative cash flows, but primarily because of the tax
shelters it offers as a protection of ordinary income. At the same
time, the professional brokers and developers, becoming increasingly more
ambitious in their undertakings, and requiring equity capital, readily
embraced the high-income investor as a potential source of funds. Tra-
ditionally this partnership of high-income investors with professional
developers has been chiefly involved in commercial and industrial real
estate development, with only a minor emphasis on residential development
in hotels and luxury apartment complexes.
Only after the Housing Act of 1961 did HDC's move strongly into the area
of housing for low and moderate income groups. Indeed there was a con-
scious attempt by the government to encourage investment in housing by
these groups largely because of the overwhelming shortage of housing in
the country. Thus, even more favorable tax concessions were granted in
the form of lower interest rates, favorable depreciation, etc.; all
offered as "carrots" by the government to attract investors into housing.
The partnership arrangement was usually divided into general partners
who were the professionals who actually expedited development and limited
partners that were largely high income investors, whose only role was to
contribute funds and reap a proportion of the profits. Most of the
groups were set up as either full-profit or limited-profit groups (the
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latter being the only way to be eligible for federal subsidy programs).
Technical capability: In general, the housing development company's
(HDC's) chief role has been that of an expediter. The general partners
were usually professionals trained in the disciplines, of land assembly,
financing, law, real estate brokerage, etc. In the case of the First
Realty Company of Boston, their main working staff comprised real estate
brokers, lawyers, economists, engineers, and investment experts. The
staff of Housing Innovations, Inc. (HII) of Boston, is much smaller and
is made up of an engineer, city planner-architect, a business administra-
tor and a lawyer. Significant in both cases is the fact that neither firm
possesses an in-house capability to implement actual construction of
buildings. What, in effect, you have is a management-development combine
that procures lands, assesses the economic feasibility of developing or
improving the income producing capability of the property, arranges meti-
culously the financing of the land and schedules the actual development.
The actual task of technically designing and constructing the property is
negotiated and often joint-ventured with architects and contractors. In
the case of HII, its infill housing was sub-contracted to a pre-fab home
builder, after all of the preliminary arrangements had been made for
financing, land acquisition, etc. First Realty in the development of
221(d)(3) housing in West Roxbury and East Boston actually joint-ventured
with construction firms to do the job.
Because he does not carry the overhead of a full construction crew, and
given the emphasis on negotiation or joint-venturing with builders, the
HDC is likely to be a producer of a wider spectrum of housing types than
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the merchant builder, who has tended to specialize in the single-family
house. In fact, most development companies have tended toward multi-
family housing units, be they high-rise apartments, garden apartments,
townhouses, or row houses, largely because of the favorable investment
possibilities. In addition, because of their affiliation with architec-
tural firms, there would seem to be a greater acceptance of innovations
in design, than the merchant builder, although observation of projects
developed by such groups does not always bear this fact out.
Administrative capability: As Denis Blackett of HII puts it, the chief
concern of a developer is time, efficient personnel, and money. Blackett's
hiring credo is to find the man who is multi-disciplined and understands
the value of performing in the minimum amount of time. Unlike the mer-
chant builder who often carries a large overhead by maintenance of a
construction crew, the development company's chief overhead is tied up
in professional talent at the executive level.
Lines of control during the development process are fairly well defined.
The contractors who actually do the buildinig are bound by contract
drawing and usually a fixed contract price. Architects, because they
are hired on a fee basis, are obligated to produce designs to the deve-
loper's satisfaction. Most development companies, because of their
tendencies to long-range holding of property, either nave an in-house
management staff to manage property or sub-contract this function to
other Lealty management firms.
In the partnership form, the limiteu partners have no votes on crucial
issues (and are rightly designated as silent partners). All of the
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liability incurred generally falls on the general partners, who are in
effect the chief officers of the firm.
Funding Sources: The investment corporation usually has need for three
kinds of financing: (1) land acquisition (in the case of new construction);
(2) interim funds to support construction; (3) the permanent financing or
take-out loan once construction has been completed. Because of the varied
modes of operation, the company may or may not need all three forms of
financing. For example, in the case of a negotiated settlement between
a construction company and the developer, the obligation to secure
interim funds for construction are left to the contractor. Such may not
be the case for the joint venture type arrangement.
(1.) Funds for land acquisition come either from profits plowed
back into development-institutional lenders (insurance companies,
mutual savings associations, etc.) or from the limited or
general partners.
(2.) Similarly funds for interim construction come from
institutional lenders, banks, savings and loans, mortgage
banking firms, and oftentimes equity investors who may be
interested in tax berefits incurred through losses during
construction.
(3.) Permanent financing again comes from banks,(with funds
guaranteed by the government in the case of federal subsidy
programs), institutional lenders and the limited and general
partners of the firm. Traditionally outside lenders have
supplied funds and made their profits chiefly through mortgage
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interest rates. However, as the size and scope of investments
have increased, these lenders have become in some cases equity
investors, or in effect partners in the firm, vying for a piece
of the profits.
Typically the limited partners are high income investors whose tax status
is usually 'at, or above the 50% level. The attractive depreciation rates
and interest on permanent financing have been effective devices for
sheltering ordinary income. Oftentimes such an investor may be attracted
toa project which has little actual cash ilow, but whose after-tax
benefits are considerable. Let me also hasten to add that the limited
partners in a development company are not "permanent" in the sense that
they are involved in all of the firm's undertakings. The general partners
are in most cases permanent members. Seemingly only as each particular
investment warrants additional funds or support are limited partners
solicited. First Realty indicated that they have a special group of
investors (limited partners) who are solicited first whenever the situa-
tion called for funds. What in effect happens is that a unique "partner-
ship" is formed for each project.
Expected profit and investment outlook: Although there are situations
where property is developed with the intention of quick sale, the HDC's
main interest is holding income-producing property for the profi in cash
flows, and tax benefits. Although sale of property occurs, it is chiefly
done when the property becomes economically unfeasible due to reduced
cash flows, or unattractive tax situations. Whereas the merchant builders'
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investment was largely a short-run issue, the housing development company's
investment outlook is long-range often involving more than a decade. Thus
his analysis of potential investment situations may of necessity be niore
future-oriented than the merchant builder since he is faced with manage-
ment and maintenance over a long stretch. One could almost infer (although
I certainly cannot substantiate this) that in terms of quality of products
produced, the development company's product is likely to be better or more
durable than the merchant builders, who may largely depend on superficiali-
ties to attract the consumer. On the other hand, because maintenance and
management are crucial elements in maintaining high cash flows and property
values, development firms tend to be highly selective in tenants, and
give more than a passing interest to the neighborhood externalities that
might hinder profits. Even under limited-profits set-ups where the tenant
is largely a low to moderate income group this dictum operates. First
Realty only builds on the fringes of the city near or in middle-class
neighborhoods, but never in the heart of the poor communities. Further-
more, its tenants undergo a stringent selection process to screen out
potential troublemakers. Although HII operates in the central city, its
selection of tenants is equally stringent in weeding out potential
"problem" families. All of this is due to the long-range investment,
and the need to minimize maintenance and management costs while
increasing profits.
Social Welfare Orientation: Investment companies tend to be attracted
to the new federal programs in housing more for the after-tax return on
invested capital rather than for some highly motivated concern for
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helping alleviate the social issues surrounding the housing crisis in
this country. Although people like Max Kargman, head of First Realty
Corporation and Denis Blackett of HII have expressed concern individually
about the problem of housing for low-income families (especially in urban
ghettos), there is clear evidence to suggest that if the profit margins
for developing housing for this income group were not sufficient, the
organizations that these gentlemen represent would "not be interested."15
Nevertheless, both firms (and probably most similarly oriented firms)
relish the favorable publicity of being identified with key social
efforts to solve the housing crisis, and as such are often willing to
make special concessions to enhance this image. Thus, HII is quite
willing to submit its proposals to severe scrutiny by community repre-
sentatives of the Model Cities area, or (in the case of the first six
Infill Housing units), readily accepted small black contractors as
builders, even though it could have utilized more efficient construction
teams. First Realty enjoys publicizing the fact that its is one of the
premier builders of moderate income housing in the country, and Kargman
is not above attending seminars and lectures in academic circles to
explain scientifically and sometimes emotionally the extent and level
16
of his commitment to the struggle. The widely publicized role of
innovators in low and moderate income housing is, in fact, a double-edged
sword. On the one hand favorable publicity and successful efforts in
development of such housings, raises the prestige of the firm, in addi-
tion to increasing the confidence of the conservative bureaucracy that
administers the federal and state programs. Thus, successful firms are
able to "grease" the wheels of the slow-grinding bureaucracy, and obtain
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even more commitments for new projects. (It has been demonstrated that
FHA and HUD tend to administer more efficiently applications from firms
17
with good track records.) However, given the rise of the community
participation syndrome in our "previously quiet" urban community, publi-
city given to developers in these areas has- made them visible to the
community and vulnerable at times to community pressure groups. Thus,
concessions to hire more black workers may not be immediately profitable
to the firm, but politically expedient to get development moving. Simi-
larly, concessions granting community participation in the planning
process may seriously curtail the efficiency and scheduling of projects,
but to avoid unfavorable publicity, the firm may have to go along.
Rarely do HDC's go into a venture in which they will surely lose control
or their profit. First Realty, has for the most part abandoned the
central city for the suburban fringes and "gray areas" surrounding the
core where the volatility of existing residents is not as severe, and
where social issues are not as salient.
Type IV. - Major Non-Profit Housing Foundations
The major non-profit housing developers refer to those organizations
chartered to develop housing or provide housing services to low and
moderate income groups, not for the purpose of making money, but rather
to facilitate or further national social goals related to housing reform.
These organizations are usually branches of some major charitable founda-
tion, labor unions, national church denominations or major political
organizations. They have proliferated during the sixties due to. new
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federal laws that encourage the development of housing, for people of
modest incomes, by non-profit organizations. (I was unable to get any
data on the actual number of such groups.)
Probably the historical antecedent for non-profit charitable housing
organizations goes back to the nineteenth century when church groups
and other charities engaged in housing reform programs to relieve the
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plight of poor immigrant groups in northern cities. Most of the
efforts at that time were largely political and social in character,
and reached a high point in New York with the passage of the Old and
New Law Tenement Acts in the late 1800's. The reforms were centered on
building codes, health, and safety standards. There were only a few
cases of actual construction and these were largely "half-way houses"
or homes for the aged, and indigents. Funds to support these groups
were largely private contributions, and in few cases were their efforts
sanctioned or backed by government.
These housing groups maintained a political interest in housing for the
poor throughout the first half of the twentieth century. But, as
believers in the ethic of "housing not being the province of the
government," they were not in the forefront when public housing was
introduced in 1937. However, as the country moved strongly into social
welfare, these early groups were replaced by a newer counterpart that
supported the more socialistic dictum expressed in the 1949 Housing Act
that stated a government policy of "a decent home for every American."
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With the passage of Housing Acts from 1961 onward, major non-profit
housing companies have been formed to take advantage of the 100% finan-
cing available to them for developing housing for low and moderate
income groups.
The following analysis of major non-profit housers was based solely on
an interview with Pat Alvis of the Foundation for Cooperative Housing
(FCH), a nationally based non-profit company chartered to offer services
and housing to low and moderate income groups. (FCH is presently nego-
tiating to build an initial development of three hundred cooperative
units in Soul City.)
Technical capability: In general, the major non-profits' technical
capability is similar to that of the profit oriented housing company.
They are mainly expediters of applications through the federal bureau-
cracy, and possess no in-house capability for construction. What they
do is acquire land, act as owner-mortgagor of the project, prepare plans
and feasibility studies, negotiate with a builder, and oversee construc-
tion. In the case of FCH, the improved property is then sold as a
cooperative to community residents, with FCH offering the option of
performing management services. In other cases, the non-profit houses
may rent to tenants, but maintain management functions. The non-profit
houser usually specializes in multi-family dwellings on a fairly large
scale. The scope of most non-profits is regional, and in many cases
national. FCH operates in 24 states and has sponsored 30,000 co-op
units at a value estimated at $450,000,000. The average size of each
project was approximately 250 units.
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Aside from the function of housing development, some non-profits offer
services to small non-profit groups as consultants. Their role is to
provide technical advice, (feasibility studies, floor plans, engineering
services, etc.) to non-profit groups unfamiliar with the development
idiom. Because of their orientation to a specific market in housing,
and the special financing made available only through federal agencies,
the non-profit housers are experts at dealing with federal funding
agencies, often having connections at the regional and national levels
to speed processing.
The non-profit houser represents an attractive resource for the development
of moderate income housing in Soul City. They also represent a resource
for providing services to community groups. Probably the only drawback
is the fact that their average size project may not exactly coincide
with a strategy that calls for minimal concentration of homogeneous income
groups. (Alvis of FCH states that it is too costly to build in concen-
trations less than 150 units.)
Administrative ability: We have indicated in the above section that most
of the non-profit's staff effort is geared to expediting. They control
the total development process from the time that land is bought. The
staff make-up is similar to that of the HDC's. However, under FCH's
services division, additional personnel are hired as management experts,
maintenance experts, community organizers and social workers. FCH poli-
cies are made by a board of directors and trustees of the foundations.
It hires an executive director to oversee the operations of the housing
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company and similarly for the services division. (The services division
presently manages 18,000 units.)
Sources of funding: Non-profit housers like FCH have need of funds for
four purposes: (1) to support preliminary studies (seed money); (2) inte-
rim construction financing; (3) permanent financing; and (4) funds to
support housing services. For seed money, many non-profits receive funds
initially from their own foundations or other foundations. If the pro-
ject undertaken receives a commitment from the government, seed money
funds are often included in the mortgage, and thus returned to a
revolving fund to be used on new ventures.
Interim construction financing is usually not difficult to arrange with
the usual lending institutions, especially when federal commitments
have been guaranteed. The problem may hinge on the availability of
funds in certain areas of the country and the predisposition of some
financiers (in the South particularly) to support the program or mission
of the houser.19
Permanent financing automatically comes from federal sources, directly
or indirectly. Under 221(D)(3) most non-profits sold their mortgages
directly to the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). Newer
programs like Section 235 and 236 are financed through banks who in turn
are paid a subsidy.
Funds to support housing services (maintenance, management), or for
consulting are set by FHA limits and are usually included in the mort-
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gage commitment, at some escalating scale commensurate with the size of
the project.
Profit and investment outlook: Non-profit housers consistent with their
name, are not in business for an expected financial return. Any resi-
duals accruing from sales or rentals, or provision of services are
generally plowed back into the projects to reduce rentals to families.
Funds are used only to cover cost of overhead, expenses, and salaries
of the professional staff. Board members and other policy makers serve
for no fee in most cases. When property is sold to community groups or
individuals, the proceeds are used primarily to pay off that portion of
the remaining mortgage. The practice is generally to sell such property
at below market prices to groups that agree to maintain the original
character and purpose of the housing.
Social welfare orientation: The following excerpt was taken from the
charter of the Foundation for Cooperative Housing, and adequately sums
up the prevailing purpose of most non-profit housers:
(FCH) is a foundation organized and operated exclusively for
charitable, scientific and educational purposes. Its objec-
tive shall be to engage in scientific research into new and
improved ways to meet the problem of inadequate housing for
the poor and disadvantaged citizens of this country, educate
those who are in a position to assist in dealing with this
crisis and to aid through its charitable efforts those citi-
zens who are unable to afford adequate housing.
Such developers would then seem to be more compliant with the social
objectives set out for Soul City and may be more inclined to support new
social and technical approaches to housing than the previously discussed
sub-developers.
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Type V. - Indigenous Community Developers
This refers to locally based community groups such as churches, masonic
groups, anti-poverty and model neighborhood organizations, and small
businessmen and laymen groups whose basic intent is to use the develop-
ment of housing as a mechanism for social and physical development in
the community (aside from the desire to alleviate the critical shortage
of housing) and also as a means of re-distributing income through creation
of a threshold device to gain entrance into the field of real estate
development. Most ICD's are inexperienced first-time venturers into the
housing field. Community organizations of this type were largely non-
existent prior to the sixties but came into being largely as a result of
the new housing and social programs like OEO, Model Cities and the Housing
Acts of 1961, 1964, 1965, and 1968. In all of these programs the dictum
of community participation and involvement in development is taken
literally by community groups. In format and approach to development,
their model is that of the Housing Developing Company described previously.
The chief distinguishing factors are the relative inexperience of the ICD's,
and their overall reason for developing housing.
Technical capability: The ICD usually has few, if any, members within
its organization who are trained in issues of development. In most cases
it must rely on outside consulting on land acquisition, management, archi-
tectural and engineering services and legal counselling. The scope and
size of many of their projects are small enough that there is little need
for some services required of larger projects. Land acquisition almost
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never is a problem since most ICD's are motivated to develop after they
own or potentially own property. Such was the case with the Ebenezer-
Brown-Emanuel Development Corporation (EBEDC) of Charleston, South Carolina
and the Little Rock Corporation of Charlotte, North Carolina. Both deve-
loper sponsors were black church groups that owned property, and had
charismatic, politically-aware ministers who had need to hire only an
architect, a builder and a lawyer to expedite the development. However,
because of inexperience, the development time starting from planning to
20
construction completion took better than 4 years. (The average time
21
for an experienced developer is 2 years.) The Southeastern Regional
Investment Corporation (SERIC) is an exception to the general picture
I've structured. Its organization is comprised of young professionals
and businessmen who have had no previous experience in housing develop-
ment, but whose professions were appropriate for such development. Among
the original ten organizers, there was a lawyer, an accountant, a real
estate broker, an architect, two engineers and a management consultant.
Thus, this group although inexperienced, had the potential for learning
the development game faster, by having some in-house capability. In fact,
it was not SERIC's intent to become a one-shot developer as the two pre-
viously mentioned church groups were, but rather to use the existing
federal programs as a stepping stone to other ventures in real estate
development.
The ICD's still had the potential for developing various housing types,
since in most cases design and construction of units were negotiated
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with professionals. In rare cases have self-help housing construction
techniques been used since federal programs like 221(d)(3) and 236 do not
22
seem to encourage their usage.
In summary, ICD's are largely lacking the technical expertise to carry
off development, but must depend on outside consulting. Their inexperience
has caused considerable delays in processing applications through federal
agencies. Recent legislation now allows professional developers to work
with such indigenous sponsors for a fee which is added to the overall
mortgage, in an effort to raise the efficiency of these groups.
Administrative capability: Largely because of their inexperience in
development, ICD's ability to efficiently carry out a project is marked
by organizational difficulties, duplication, poor interpretation of
guidelines and inadequate managerial experience depending on the degree
or proportion of services that are handled by laymen with those handled
by other professionals. While most ICD's recognize their technical incom-
petence in design and construction of housing units, the administrative
tasks of pushing the application through the various bureaucracies and
financial institutions are not readily observed, at the outset, as being
obstacles that require professional expertise. From my personal experience
with SERIC in Charlotte, the initial reaction to public relations brochures
on 221(d)(3) misled most of the members of the group into believing that
processing the application for a commitment was very straightforward.
The fact is that by the time a project reaches the final closing, the
application process will have undergone six different review stages
(depending on scope and composition). It is ironical that the ICD's
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introduction into the development idiom involves extensive dealings with
the federal bureaucracies, whose rigorous regulations and cumbersome pro-
cedures tend to make even the more experienced developers minimize their
contacts to avoid the red tape. Nevertheless, ICD's rarely bother to
hire professional help to expedite applications through the bureaucracies,
or to handle the daily tasks of administration. Even during the post-
development period, when management becomes crucial to overall financial
success, the tendencies of most such groups is to utilize laymen or
inexperienced professionals to manage and maintain the property.
Because of this characteristic inexperience, ICD's are likely to take
considerably longer periods of time to process applications through HUD.
On the other hand, federal bureaucrats tend to be conservative and pro-
tective of their position in the bureaucracy and respond favorably to
those developers that reflect glory on the bureaucracy. The ICD's repre-
sent risks to the bureaucracy in terms of their inexperience, and agencies
fear that highly publicized "misappropriation" of funds may be a source of
considerable embarrassment.
Funding sources: ICD's are almost totally dependent on federal subsidies.
Most are non-profit, while a few are of the limited-profit variety.
Non-profits are eligible for 100% financing. Limited-profit groups get
90% financing in most cases, thus requiring at least a 10% equity invest-
ment by such developers. In the case of SERIC, the 10% requirement was
raised through getting credit for land, by negotiating the builder and
sponsor's profit and risk allowance with the contractor, and by individual
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cash contributions of the investors. (The actual cash contribution
amounted to only 4%. of the replacement cost.)
Once a federal commitment has been made, interim financing is not
particularly difficult with local lending institutions. A more difficult
problem is securing seed money to support preliminary planning. Recently
seed money has been made available by the federal government to non-profit
developers. Previously such funds were gotten from foundations, poverty
programs, and in the case of church groups, from the church general funds.
Precisely because seed money is so difficult to come by, most ICD's have
been forced to operate in a kind of seat-of-the-pants fashion. Limited
profit sponsors, for the most, have used their individual investors as a
source, although these funds have been relatively too small to support
the needed professional counsel.
Expected profit and investment outlook: The ICD's I've mentioned
previously all hold rental property. There are cases where the projects
are sold to tenants as a cooperative housing unit, or in the case of
single-family units, the property is sold to individual home owners.
Church groups like E.B.E. and Little Rock express a viewpoint that is
somewhat selfish in motive. They expect to maintain control over the
projects for very long periods, precisely to enable them to provide
decent dwellings for members of their congregations~ that cannot afford
housing in the private market. By selling as a cooperative, or relin-
quishing control, they lose the advantage of being able to fulfill the
function of providing shelter for its poor constituents, especially since
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they view this target population as being one in a state of constant
turnover.
Limited profit sponsors, although able to receive only 6% of the 10% on
invested capital tend to be holders of rental property. In many respects
their investment outlook is not much different from the Housing Develop-
ment Companies. However, they do not enjoy the full benefit of tax
shelters because of the tendency toward lower incomes on the part of
investor members. Thus the small cash flow is their chief source of
profit. However, if the property is held beyond fifteen years, and if
vacancies are appreciably kept below the 5% rate, the possibilities of
selling the property may have significant financial benefits. Aside
from the financial benefits, there seems to be (at least in the case
of SERIC) some psychological benefit for small businessmen, laymen and
professionals from being part-owners of real property and as such havin~g a
significant "stake" in the community.
Social welfare orientation: Because of their limited or non-profit
orientation, ICD's are likely to be more firmly interested in social
welfare issues like supplying decent shelter, community participation,
and overall community improvement. Also, because they tend to be local
and permanent residents in the area, they are likely to have a greater
empathy and understanding of the iife styles of the population, thus
taking an ev en greater interest in community affairs. They may be very
receptive to aeveloping community talent, through on-the-job training,
both at the technical or construction level, and at the administrative
and management level. Although admittedly at the level of dealing with
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bureaucracies, financial institutions, etc.,. they lack finesse and
experience, their local political knowledge and ability to mobilize
community people around crucial social issues can be effective in sup-
porting their case before these institutions. In summary, ICD's seem to
be the prototypical kind of group that would satisfy the social welfare
ideals of community involvement in housing and environmental issues,
largely because of their low-profit motivation and the fact that they
are already permanent residents of the community, intimately involved
with the people and the crucial issues of the moment.
Type VI. - The Joint Venture
Joint ventures will be defined here as coalitions between the prime
developer, McKissick Enterprises, and any of the previously mentioned
five sub-developer types. The ostensible purpose of such a device is to
allow the prime developer to facilitate the building of the town beyond
the infrastructure stage, by supplying either venture capital (where risk
on the part of the developer is serious), administrative expertise (where
such expertise is non-existent and therefore detrimental to successful
development) and where innovation and experimentation are needed (where
tiew housing systems and dwelling types may be required or desired).
Rather than follow the typical format used in describing the other
developers, a summary of the possible situations that might call for a
joint venture will be used. The possible situations posed here are not
exhaustive, but are merely our indication of the possibilities:
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1. McKissick Enterprises - Merchant Builder
At some point the prime developer may wish to experiment in marketing a
style of house significantly different from those currently being pro-
duced by the merchant builder. (I have in mind something at a higher
level than the mere change in design of a single-family house from tradi-
tional to contemporary). This may be a new process of producing housing,
a new industrialized system, or a new way to utilize the single-family
house. Whatever the innovations, the merchant builder may be a reluctant
developer if the start-up costs or re-tooling processes are significant
in relationship to the potential profits. In such a case ME may be forced
to risk venture capital with the merchant builder often with the stipula-
tion that if such prototypical experimentation is successful, the prime
developer would receive royalty payments for all other subsequently
developed units.
2. McKissick Enterprises - Housing Development Company
McKissick as a limited partner in an HDC. McKissick's role as a limited
partner would be to supply equity funds and in effect become the sole
limited partner or one of the limited partners. The HDC's are particularly
adaptable to this arrangement since each individual project involves a
unique investment partnership. McKissick may choose to put up capital
largely to encourage development by a particular HDC that may be
interested in development but unable to interest other investors. As
limited partners they are in effect only "paper" partners, with all of
the.other responsibilities for expediting the development of housing left
to the general partners. It is conceivable that even in cases where risks
may be minimal, the prime developer may want to venture capital as a
limited partner largely as a means of controlling HDC's policies, or
simply to take advantage of a profitable market. In any event, the
involvement can be minimal, requiring only a cash outlay (or land) and
requiring no commitment or personnel or time. From the viewpoint of
HDC's the involvement of the prime developer represents a few advantages
other than the factor of lessening risks. McKissick may be expected to
use his prestige and political influence in the local area and with
government agencies to push through projects. Furthermore, his familiarity
with the region may be valuable in supplying information on local con-
struction practices for those HCD's headquartered at considerable
distances from the target area.
3. McKissick Enterprises - Indigenous Community Developers
McKissick as a general partner to limited profit groups or as developer
consultant to non-profit groups. As a general partner, McKissick may
actively form limited dividend corporation made up of small businessmen
or iaymen for the purpose of developing more housing and furthering goals
of community participation. Although it may provide some capital, its
chief role would be that of expediter, handling all of the administrative
and management of the project. A by-product would be the training of
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lay personnel in the techniques of development, such that future projects
might be carried out independently.
In the cases of non-profit indigenous groups, McKissick could operate as
the developer consultant and receive a direct fee from the government to
process such applications through the federal agercies. Admittedly, this
will have a tendency to tie up the prime developer's personnel in small
scale parcel development, and the fees received may well cover only cost,
but McKissick may be willing or forced to piy this role to encourage
social welfare goals.
McKissick again gets the advantage of significant control over ICD's at
least for initial development, while also engaging in a training function,
not to menti-n the intangible gain of affording community involvement in
housing.
4. McKissick Enterprises - Small Home Builder
McKissick may actively recruit such potential developers through the
promise of start-up funds and venture capital. While McKissick may not
become a legal member of each individual firm, it may act as a manage-
ment and technical consultant, to the largely inexperienced developer.
The delivery of. funds and services might be through write-down on the
cost of lana, direct capital grants, or capital equipment necessary for
production. In all cases, these would be loans paid back over a period
of time, sufficient to allow the sub-developer a chance to realize a
profit. Although each individual builder may require only a relatively
small amount of funds or servicds, collectively the investment by
McKissick might be significant. The value to the prime developer is
not in the profit made on the loans, (for in many cases the interest
rates may be below market rates), but in the furthering of economic
development among indigenous residents of the area. It is conceivable
that such developers may over the long haul grow and become a chief
source of labor supply for later development.
To summarize. The joint venture, by its very nature, is a kind of last-
ditch effort-by the prime developer to encourage development by his
sub-developers. Faced with the need to sell land at a given pace, and
the corresponding need to avoid the appearance of stagnated development,
the prime may be forced to show faith in his town by taking on further
risks in housing development. Ideally what is hoped for is that there
be no need for the joint-venture. However, such is not likely to be the
case in Soul City, and in planning the housing development process,
McKissick may be wise to set aside considerable capital for possible
joint-ventures.
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Type VII. - The Public Housing Agency
This sub-developer refers to the sole public agency of a local governmental
unit charged with the responsibility of providing housing for low-income
families.
Although the initial concept of government-built housing was resisted by
private housing groups, the intervening years since the inception of the
program in 1937 have brought on the gradual acceptance of such housing
as a part of the total housing picture in the United States. Though the
concept has been accepted in principle, the actual production of public
housing units has been slow in comparison to the need. Public Housing
23Agencies have built 650,000 units since 1939.
In the first years of the program, construction was rather brisk. The
idealized recipient of this housing was pictured to be the hard-working
deserving poor, victimized severely by the depression, the elderly, and
the handicapped. World War II slowed production to a standstill and not
until 1949 did a revival in construction start but never at the pace of
the early days. The 1949 Housing Act changed the policy of public
housing, using it as a device for slum clearance. Local agencies. had to
certify that for each new unit of housing built a corresponding unit of
slum housing had to be demolished. The slum clearance provision had the
net effect of only replacing housing while not increasing the supply of
low-income units. Subsequent provisions of the law now make it possible
to build new units where there is "an acute shortage of decent, safe,
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and sanitary housing available to families of low income."24 The slowness
of production can be attributed to many factors, not the least being the
fact that the clientele for public housing has undergone a perceived
change by the public, from the hard-working poor to the "less socially
desirable" racial minority groups, welfare recipients, and the unemployed.
Technical capability: Housing agencies are structured similarly to the
Type III and Type IV sub-developers. They possess no in-house construc-
tion capability, choosing instead to co tract with other builders or
developers to construct the required units. The predominant housing
type is the multi-family unit. Typically, these units provide only the
basic necessities, a d are durably constructed to last for periods of
up to sixty years.
In recent years, there has been an attempt to get more involvement by
the private housers, and also to improve the environmental and esthetic
quality of the projects. The new Turnkey programs reflect this new
direction in policy. However, under traditional methods of developing
the agencies acquire land, perform feasibility studies, provide engineering
services, and supervise construction. Units are designed and built
according to strict federal guidelines to insure minimum property standards.
Administrative ability: In the traditional housing agency, all of the
administrative tasks required for development and post-development
management are staffed within the agency or local governing bureaus.
In the Leasing program, all of the development is handled by the private
developer. The maintenance function is shared with the local agency.
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The agency is also responsible for placing tenants and other management
functions.
Under Turnkey, development is also the responsibility of the private
developer. The agency buys the project from the developer to resell to
Lenants or co-op groups. It is the agency's responsibility to assess
the plans of the project to determine feasibility and conformance to
federal guidelines.
In addition to administrative functions related to maintenance and
management, the Housing Act of 1968 authorized local agencies to provide
"tenant services" in the form of counseling on household management,
25
child care, housekeeping, etc. Such functions are administered usually
by the existing municipal agency charged to deliver such social services.
Funding sources: Local public housing agencies get most of their funds
26
from the United States Housing Authority. For land acquisition and
development, the local agencies are eligible for loans up to 90% of
replacement cost, or capital grants not to exceed 25% of replacement
cost. To be eligible for grants, the local government must contribute
at least 20% of replacement cost in either cash, land, or community ser-
vices or facilities. The 10% required equity in the case of a maximum
loan may also be contributed in a similar fashion. Some municipalities
raise their equity by issuing bonds.
Funds to maintain the low rent character of the project are allocated by
the federal authority in the form of annual contributions. The amount
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of such funds is fixed by the federal government, and are dependent cn
local characteristics of personal income, cost of housing and prevailing
construction costs.
Profit and investment outlook: Public housing. agencies are non-profit.
Their mission is to provide a public service, and as such any residuals
accruing to the agency are applied to reducing the annual contribution
granted by the government.
Social welfare orientation: Public housing was ostensibly conceived to
satisfy social welfare objectives. Past performan-es seem to indicate
that housing agencies too narrowly defined their mission. The emphasis
for so long has been on the mere provision of cheap shelter, at the
expense of relating that shelter to the social needs of the tenant.27
Recognition of the failure to administer to the social needs of the poor,
resulted in revised legislation in 1968 calling for tenant services, and
participation by the tenant in project management. Even more recent
emphasis on homeownership, through sale of public housing units to
tenants, reflects a new policy of granting to the tenant the maximum
degree of control over his housing environment.
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CHAPTER VI. CRITERIA FOR RANKING SUB-DEVELOPERS
Given the essential characteristics of the various potential sub-developers,
McKissick at some point in the preliminary development stages must make
some assessment or evaluation of where and how each developer can be used
to further his own specific required objective for low-income housing and
the total housing program for Soul City.
In order to systematically get at this problem I propose the development
of a set of criteria that quite possibly may be pertinent to the prime
developer in judging the potential use of sub-developers. The following
list of criteria is not all-inclusive, but merely representative of the
kind of requirements the prime developer may want to use in his evaluation
process. For each criterion, the sub-developers are ranked according to
how well their particular characteristics satisfy or fit the specific
requ-rement. In the interest of brevity, I shall rank only the first
four, from best to worst, on the theory that while the other three may
satisfy some modicum of the criterion, their value to the prime is mar-
ginal when comapred to the first four.
The criteria used are:
1. Degree of technical and administrative expertise;
2. Capability of producing a broad range of housing types;
3. Probable capacity to accept innovation and experimental housing;
4. Orientation to social welfare issues;
5. Investment outlook as it relates to tenant control and
management;
6. Aid required by the prime developer to support sub-developer.
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The potential
Type I
Type II
Type III
Type IV
Type V
Type VI
Type VII
sub-developers are:
- Merchant builder
- The potential small home builder
- Housing development companies (HDC's)
- Major professional non-profit companies
- Indigenous community corporations (ICD's)
- Joint-ventures -- prime and sub-developer
- Public housing agencies
Criterion #1 - Degree of technical and administrative expertise
Sub-developer
1. Type
2. Type
3. Type
4. Type
ranking:
I
III
IV
VI
This criterion refers to the abilityof the developer to handle all of the
required tasks inherent in housing development. All of the above deve-
lopers evidence some substantial track record. Type I ranks first largely
because they possess the total in-house capability to produce their pro-
duct, despite the fact that the degree of efficiency is directly related
to the size of the organization. Both Type III and IV are probably
equally adept, but must depend on outside sources to perform some func-
tions. Type VI is mentioned as a last resort, largely because the -joint
venture is a definite possibili-y with Types I, III, or IV. If the land
development strategy of scattered site development is valid, then these
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four developers by virtue of their size and expertise may be the only
ones capable of absorbing t e built-in inefficiencies, that are inherent
in such a strategy, through tight control and scheduling techniques.
Although none of these sub-developers is likely to be "comfortable" with
the scattered site strategy (probably preferring the traditional large
scale contiguous approach), they represent to the prime developer the
only resource for fast, large scale development over a wide area.
Criterion #2 - Capability of producing a broad range of housing types
Sub-developer ranking:
1. Type III
2. Type IV
3. Type I
4. Type VI
This criterion refers to the sub-developer's versatility in producing a
variety of housing types preferably over a broad income range. Again,
the same four "professional" sub-developers rank high. Type III ranks
highest, largely because of his track record in producing a variety of
multi-family units (apartment blocks, townhouses, rowhouses, garden units,
etc.), for high and low income families. Type IV- seems equally capable
of a variety of styles, but is ranked second largely because they are
restricted to low-income ranges. Type I is given a qualified ranking,
because certain large merchant builders have displayed the ability to
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produce more than the single-family housing type. Type VI is mentioned
again because of the joint-venture possibilities.
The value of versatility may be considered an important characteristic
given the strategy of scattered site development, and the goal of inter-
spersing income groups. Conceivably those developers that can build a
wide variety of types will minimize inefficiencies by buying contiguous
parcels even when the stipulated housing type is different for each parcel.
Likewise, if such a developer can build over a broad income spectrum, he
further increases his chances of consolidating parcels. From the prime
developer's viewpoint, versatility means dealing with fewer sub-
developers, thus reducing administrative problems.
Criterion #3 - Probable capacity to produce innovative and experimental
housing
Sub-developer ranking:
1. Type VI
2. Type IV
3. Type III
4. Type V
To satisfy goals of providing new technical and social innovations in
housing, the prime developer on his own, or as a joint venture, may have
to risk capital. Type IV developers, because of their social welfare
orientation, may also be able to attract funds to support innovations.
Their chief concern may be more in the direction of financial and socio-
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economic experimentation in home ownership, ianagement, etc. Type III
as a sub-developer is probably less concerned with social issues, but
.given substantial connections in political circles (which is a prerequi-
site for acquiring funds), this sub-developer might well engage in
technical innovations largely because of the potential for publicity in
the likelihood of "successful" efforts. The Type V developer, although
possessing little in the way of professional expertise, is listed
because his social welfare motivation would seem to make him likely and
willing experimenters in new programs.
Criterion #4 - Orientation to social welfare issues
Sub-developer ranking:
1. Type V
2. Type IV
3. Type II
4. Type VII
This criterion basically asks the question "which sub-developer best
exemplifies the spirit of maximum participation by community in the
development process. Clearly the indigenous community groups (Type V)
seem to be the most likely developer concerned with such goals, primarily
because they are locally based, familiar with local problems of the poor,
and are identifiable by the poor as being "of the community." Thus, they
are more likely to want to involve local people in construction and
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training programs, and in tenant control and management once development
is completed. Home ownership, also democratic rule, and social economic
mobility are likely to be widely held values among ICD's. Type IV deve-
lopers are equally likely to be concerned about social welfare issues,
but their size, and regionally based headquarters, make them "invisible"
benefactors of the poor. Furthermore, such o-ganizations may at times
be more concerned with product and efficiency, than with process and
community participation. Type II developer, although profit-oriented,
by his local character, and indigenous roots, can be identified by the
co'mmunity as a member gaining a "piece" of the development action.
Type VII is mentioned largely because its stated mission is the pro-
vision of housing for those citizens unable to compete in private
markets. It has only very recently begun to deal with issues of commu-
nity participation, tenant management and homeownership.
Criterion #5 - Investment outlook as it relates to maximum tenant control
and management
Sub-developer ranking:
1. Types I & II
2. Type V
3. Type IV
4. Type VII
Both developers Types I and II have short-range investment outlooks. The
quick sale of units directly to the consumer who becomes the homeowner
represents the ideal in terms of tenant management and control. The
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Type V and Type IV developers have the option of outright sales to
cooperative or individual users, or of retaining some degree of control
through rental. In the case of a rental type of tenure, these groups
.do not seem adverse to the idea of tenant management boards, grievance
committees, and other devices that allow for significant tenant voice in
surrounding issues of housing and maintenance. Public housing authori-
ties are relatively new and reluctant to the dynamics of community
participation, although they possess the legal authority to encourage
homeownership and tenant management through its various programs of
Turnkey, Leasing, etc.
Criterion #6 -. Probable aid required by prime developer to support
sub-developer
Sub-developer ranking:
1. Type II
2. Type V
3. Type VI
The Type II developer may require the greatest amount of aid, both in the
form of technical and administrative assistan e and in the actual lending
of capital to support the cost of starting up. Furthermore, the prime'
developer may be forced to be the buyer of last resort. In the case of
the Type IV developer, the prime developer may be required to offer
technical, administrative and political advice in expediting applications
through the federal bureaucracies. ."Seed" money to limited-profit spon-
sors may also be required. If the joint-venture is requir d, the
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developers' contributions are likely to be a combination of technical
administrative, and financial aid.
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CHAPTER VII. THE BARGAINING PROCESS: SUB-DEVELOPER VS. PRIME DEVELOPER
Once the prime developer has assessed and evaluated the strengths and
weaknesses of each sub-developer, he is now in a position to more accu-
rately define what bargaining positions he may have to take to induce
development by each sub-developer type. McKissick Enterprises has taken
the position that it will want from each sub-developer three things:
1. An agreement to buy land at the stipulated sales price.
Obviously, because their chief source of profit is derived
through sales of land, McKissick maintains that dilution of
landprices will have an adverse effect on his ability to
carry through on long range overall development.
2. Compliance by sub-developer to build according to stated
guidelines of the planning documents. This would seem to
indicate that sub-developers must conform to land-use and
parcel plans which presumably will ti- down factors such as
the number and type of housing units, density maximums or
projected income ranges of potential users.
3. Agreement by sub-developer to submit proposal of
development plans to Soul City design-review board. The
McKissick staff feels that in order to maintain control and
coordination o the visual environment, they must pass
judgment on the proposed plans of each builder to evaluate
massing, use of materials, and overall design quality.
Given the fact that the social welfare objective is central to the Soul
City concept, I would propose that the developers add two additional
requirements from each sub-developer. They are:
4. Stipulation that indigenous and unskilled workers be
employed in construction training. This would satisfy the
objective of providing meaningful economic opportunity to
the poor and unskilled.
5. Stipulation that prospective consumers of housing be
allowed some modicum of participation in housing management
with some timetable to allow for complete control or owner-
ship by tenants. This would insure that eventually residents
could participate and eventually control their housing
environment.
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It is not likely that the prime developer will get uniform compliance by
each sub-developer on all the stipulated demands above. It does, however,
seem probable that McKissick's bargaining position is strengthened in
direct proportion to his ability to satisfy the counter-demands or pre-
conditions of each sub-developer. It is conceivable that in each case
the prime developer will be forced to surrender concessions.
To determine the nature or degree of concessions that may be required by
the prime developer, I have made a study of the probable pre-conditions
for venturing in Soul City for each sub-developer type. Some of these
pre-conditions or demands were gotten directly through interviews with
sub-developers. Other insights were inferred from the specific charac-
teristics of the developer. By assessing each sub-developer's pre-conditions
the prime developer can decide what negotiating stance would be required to
induce development.
Type I. THE MERCHANT BUILDER
Pre-conditions for Soul City development: (the following comments were
excerpted from 'interviews I had with representatives of Ervin Construc-
tion Company, Thomasson Construction Company, and The H. A. DeCosta
Company.)
1. Positive evidence of the existence of a potential market
for housing. Positive evidence was considered to be market
data from reliable sources supplied by the prime developer,
in addition to personal investigation by each guilder to
assess the locational problems inherent with the new town.
Positive indications that industrial commitments had been
made to Soul City was considered a major factor in deter-
mining job availability, and the probable income ranges of
residents.
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2. Assurance of the availability of funds from local financial
institutions. Although the Ervin Company was not overly con-
cerned about this, the smaller builders (DeCosta and Thomasson)
indicated that their existing sources of funds were not likely
to want to invest outside a certain area. (Small banks and
savings and loans rarely operate beyond the confines of their
immediate community.)
3. All of the builders said they would require some assurance
that there existed in the region a "reasonable" size construc-
tion industry, which I assumed meant adequate materials
suppliers, and a skilled labor force. The builders, if con-
vinced to venture in Soul City, expected to recruit a
significant number of skilled workers from the region, with
supervisory personnel coming from the home office. The
availability of materials suppliers was more crucial to the
smaller builders than to Ervin, who generally maintained large
warehouses and bought directly from the manufacturer in bulk.
4. The credibility of the developer was a factor mentioned by
all the builders. Although the merchant builder's investment
is essentially short range, he must rely heavily on the
judgments and competence of the prime developer. Thus, some
indication of the financial solvency of the prime, an evalua-
tion of at least the short range goals of the town, with some
assessment of past performances and overall reliability were
considered major factors.
Of the above four pre-conditions, the two relating to market factors and
developer credibility seem, in my opinion, to be most crucial. Interim
funds for construction, or availability of labor, while important factors
are minimized if market data is favorable, and the prime developer dis-
plays an ability to carry through on development. Obviously then,
McKissick's position is enhanced-if he can show convincing market infor-
mation, and financial stability. In reality, no amount of data will be
convincing to all the builders, and McKissick will be forced to concede
some of his demands.
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Likely concessions:
1. Relaxation of the design review process. Given the fact
that merchant builders depend on a single housing type, and
the repetitive use of similar models, these developers are
not likely to relish risking the chance of having a design
review board tamper with their mode of operation. The prime
developer sacrifices some control over design quality, but
may consider this cost minimal when compared with other
alternatives.
2. Elimination of the training programs for unskilled workers.
The merchant builder is their concern, for efficiency and speed are
not wont to be saddled with training unskilled workers, although
they may well be a source of employment as laborers. The cost to
the developer may be significant in social and political terms.
3. Lower land sales price or delayed payment on land. The
prospect of lower prices on land may be most attractive to
builders who may require that profit margins be greater because
of the potential risks involved in new town ventures. This con-
cession, in financial terms, hurts McKissick but may be the
primary one to induce development in early stages when risks are
greater.
The size of the merchant builder may be- an all-important factor in the
bargaining process. Small merchant builders buying smaller quantities
of land may be more compliant once they are satisfied that a potential
market exists for their product. The larger builders who may want to
buy in large quantities may use the size of their purchase as leverage
to extract more stringent concessions from the prime developer. Further-
more, the large, experienced builder in dealing with an inexperienced,
untried prime developer may psychologically gain the upper hand in any
bargaining session, because he is presumed to be an expert. It may be
wise for McKissick to avoid this situation by choosing the middle-sized
firm (75-210 houses per year) which could offer both the needed efficiency,
yet still be controllable by the amount of land he is allowed to develop.
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Finally, McKissick can ill afford not to deal with the merchant builder
in the event that his likely concessions still fail to bring on an
agreement to build. Further concessions may be made, because the
merchant builder's efficiency and minimal support required of the
prime developer in early years of development may be more valuable in
moving development along at a brisk pace, than the "temporary" losses
given up during the negotiation period.
Type III. THE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
Pre-conditions for Soul City development: (The following are largely
comments taken from an interview with Denis Blackett of Housing Innova-
tions. They are not radically different from the concerns expressed by
the merchant builder, and as such, I will only relate those points that
are peculiar to the HDC's outlook on development.)
1. Credibility of the prime developer is most important to
HDC's who are faced with potential long-range investments in
income-producing property. HDC's would be concerned that the
prime developer is capable of planning and following through
on all of the important areas of town development to insure
that their investment be protected from property de-valuation
and adverse environmental factors. To this end, an evaluation
of the developer's financial solvency and the competency of
his planning proposals would adequately allow the chance to
assess the risk in developing in Soul City.
2. Market data from reliable sources was also considered a
primary factor. Salient features to indicate a favorable
market outlook were: the existence of a noticeable growth
in population in the region, a shortage of adequate housing,
the influx of new industries, and the degree of accessibility
to other major population centers.
3. As potential early developers, Blackett felt that HDC's
would definitely seek to minimize their risks by asking for
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lower land prices with higher potential profit margins, or
purchase-money mortgages on land acquisitions to minimize
their initial out-of-pocket expenses.
4. Assurance that local financial institutions would back
construction loans was a secondary concern related to mini-
mizing the time involved in expediting development. In most
cases, HDC's permanent financing would come from previously
utilized resources. Because many HDC's would be new to the
region, they might want to be assured that the prime deve-
loper has established a reasonable rapport with local and re-
gional offices of the federal housing bureaucracies to
facilitate smooth processing of applications.
5. Finally, the availability of a construction work force
in the region, or construction companies, or contractors
with good track records in multi-family dwelling construc-
tion, that existed in large enough numbers to support the
possible "boom" period in construction the Soul City area
was considered of some importance.
Again, solid market information, evidence of financial solvency, and
competence are key factors that would strengthen the bargaining position
of the prime developer. Presumably, HDC's will want to take a longer
and harder look at these factors, because of their long-range investment
outlook. In looking at the possible concessions that could be made,
McKissick may be more prone to give up those requirements that were
"temporary" financial losses, but holding on to those that might entail
permanent social costs. Thus, he may want to hold out for tenant parti-
cipation in management, with some prior agreement that ownership be
transferred to the tenants at an agreed upon date. Likewise, he may
want to hold out for construction training programs, largely because
HDC's generally utilize larger construction companies that could more
easily absorb unskilled workers.
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Pre-conditions related to "greasing" the wheels of the local bureaucracies
may be quite possible for McKissick to handle given his prior performances
in the political arena, and the federal government's prior commitment
(at this point) to back Soul City. But the problem of procuring con-
struction firms to handle development are largely dependent on the state
of the economy at the time of impending development. At best, McKissick's
staff can only compile a list of potential construction firms in the
state.
Likely concessions:
1. Relaxation of design review process. This might be
reasonable since the relative quality of construction and
design by HDC's are generally better than merchant builders,
because of their long-range investment characteristic.
2. Agree to delayed payments on land. Conceivably, by
minimizing the front end expense the HDC's minimize their
risks, but get the benefits of appreciating land values in
the event of successful town growth. HDC's may further
insist that the price of land be lowered directly at time
of sale and depending on McKissick's bargaining position he
may have to concede this also.
The HDC's, because of their flexibility, versatility and efficiency, also
represent a potential major builder of housing (of all types) in Soul
City, and may also be indispensable to the prime developer in early
stage development.
Type IV. THE MAJOR NON-PROFIT COMPANIES
Pre-conditions for Soul City development: (These are excerpts from an
informal conversation with Pat Alvis of the Foundation for Cooperative
Housing (FCH), a major non-profit houser.)
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1. Market factors. Some evidence that a critical need for low
and moderate income housing existed in the seven-county Soul
City region.
2. Land price. Guarantee that land prices not exceed federal
appraised market value, and that such land not be "marginal,"
instead being accessible to proposed major activity areas, and
serviced by all necessary utilities.
3. Long-range evidence that the projected environment for
Soul City will enhance the housing development, resulting in
appreciation, rather than depreciation of the value of the
property. This pre-condition was motivated by a concern that
residents as potential buyers of their housing would "take
over" housing that had some "increased net worth."
McKissick's bargaining position appears to be strongest with the major
non-profit developer, largely because their social welfare orientation
tends to coincide with the overall goals of the new town. It is not
likely then that the prime developer will have to concede very much
beyond assuring that land prices fall within federal appraisal values.
However, because of their tendency to build housing in large contiguous
areas, McKissick may want to bargain, in exchange for lower land sales
prices; that building occur strictly according to his scattered site
land development strategy. Conceivably, non-profit housers will not
be adverse to design review boards, construction training programs, and
tenant management issues, thus McKissick may find that in early stage
development, the Type IV developer may be his prime vehicle for imme-
diately satisfying relevant social and environmental goals. In addition,
early involvement in Soul City enhances the chances that the Type IV
developer can be used as a training model for potential indigenous
community developers.
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Type II and Type V. INEXPERIENCED INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY DEVELOPERS
Pre-conditions for development in Soul City: (Inferred assumptions and
my own personal experience with SERIC are the bases for the following.)
The community developers, although partially interested in the profit
motive, tend to bring a different slant to their requirements for
involvement in Soul City. Rather than define credibility of the prime
developer, in terms of competence and financial ability to produce, they
tend to see it in terms of social commitment to uplift the plight of the
poor.
1. Confirmation that a "market" exists for low and moderate
income housing. This definition of market is related more to
the potential attractiveness of the total environment for poor
people. Most such groups already know that there is a critical
shortage of decent housing. What they are concerned about is more
than decent shelter. Market means, adequate social programs to
minister to the needs of potential tenants, a politically respon-
sive environment, and meaningful jobs.
2. Assurance that the developer's "commitment" extends to
cover needed financial and technical support. This would be
in the form of lowered land prices, "seed money" backing,
expedition of applications through federal bureaucracy, etc.
3. Small builders may want assurances that their risks are
further minimized by holding out for guaranteed buy-back
agreements.
Obviously the biggest concessions the prime developer will have to make
come in dealing with the community developers. These concessions, how-
ever, are largely in economic terms. The cost of "baby-sitting" each
developer, the possibility of direct financial assistance, and the
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increased risk of having to bail out financially-troubled groups means
that the prime developer's financial position must be solid before he
chooses to solicit this group. On the other hand, because his role is
almost that of a benefactor (at least in first ventures by these groups)
he may exert a great deal of control and compliance in exchange for his
financial and technical support. However, in reality, indigenous groups
may internalize how valuable they are to the Soul City concept (in that
they epitomize the goals of community involvement in development) and
are likely to resist absolute compliance with the wishes of the prime
developer, despite his heavy financial and technical assistance. In any
event, the cost to McKissick is lower profits in return for fulfillment
of social welfare aims.
There are, nevertheless, long-range financial benefits to be derived
along with the potential for personal satisfaction. McKissick may want
to publicize widely the involvement of ICD's and small builders, since
they are in character with his goals for Soul City. To do this, his
initial investments in them can be rationalized as making sure that each
such developer is "successful," in the public eye. On the other hand,
successful ventures by these groups may pay long-range dividends, par-
ticularly if they become more than "one-time" developers. These new-found
skills may be parlayed into the advanced years as a primary source for
housing development, but more important, many such developers may
export their "expertise" to other areas similar to Soul City. To the
extent that they have been nurtured and guided by McKissick, the concepts
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of Soul City will potentially be proselytized far beyond the regional
area of the town. If such were the case, McKissick's initial investment
will have paid great dividends, both economically and socially.
Type VI. THE JOINT VENTURE
The possible situations previously discussed regarding use of joint
ventures seem adequate to describe the conditions under which McKissick
may have to become involved directly in housing developments. (See
Chapter 5.)
Type VII. THE PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCY
(Because there does not now exist such an agency in the Warren County
area, and also because of the expressed reluctance of the prime developer
to consider the need for such an agency, the following discussion departs
from the format above, and is mainly a scenario of possible positions
that can be taken by the prime developer in dealing with such public
housers. Implicit in the discussion is an argument for establishing
a public housing agency in the Soul City area.)
McKissick may be forced to deal with a public housing agency only as a
last resort, when previous private efforts do not adequately reach the
bottom of the income market. Given the prime developer's attitude
toward incorporation of Soul City, (he does not choose to do so imme-
diately), any public housing needed in the first years of Soul City
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development will necessarily have to be administered by the county, with
the resulting responsibility being county-wide rather than singly Soul
City. To my knowledge, there does not now exist a public housing agency
in Warren County, which means that to establish such an agency, McKissick
may have to lobby effectively with county and state officials to get one
established.
The county would have to be convinced that there existed a county-wide
need for public housing. It would further want to assess what the cost
to the taxpayers would be, given the fact that the law requires at least
a 10% contribution toward development cost if the United States government
loans 90%. The county may further want to assess the losses in taxes it
will incur (public housing projects are tax exempt and make payments in
lieu of taxes not exceeding 10% of the annual shelter rents) if public
housing is used. Finally the lack of personnel and the cost of staffing
a public housing agency may be additional factors to weigh also by county
officials.
McKissick on the other hand may be able to make some strong arguments
to counter. First of all, by increasing the population and income capa-
city of the county, the financial coffers of Warren County are likely to
increase due to new tax resources many times its present size. In rela-
tionship to the size of the county, compared to Soul City, the losses
in taxes (due to exemption clause) are likely to be felt more in Soul
City than on a countywide basis. The 10% contribution might be contri-
buted in services, land, etc. (McKissick may have to donate land in this
-133-
case to convince county officials.) Finally, under various new programs
in public housing, private developers might take on the responsibility
of development and management (Turnkey and Leasing) with the local
agency being merely a conduit for annual contributions from the Federal
Housing Authority. Such an arrangement could minimize the personnel
problem and the overall cost of establishing such an agency.
Let me re-emphasize that McKissick seems to feel that other programs
involving private sub-developers will allow him to reach the lowest
income families in Soul City without resorting to the need for public
housing (primarily rent-supplement under Section 236 and Section 221(d)(3)).
Nevertheless, there is the possibility that families may be attracted to
Soul City that may have little or no incomes. This may be due to the
slowness of industries moving into Soul City, with jobs for such fami-
lies, or due to faulty market information that failed to anticipate the
large influx of such families. Whether these extremely low-income
families are victims of a temporary or terminal condition, Soul City
seemingly is obligated to make accommodations. (Under.public housing,
there are no minimum income limits, although in the Orange County-Chapel
Hill area reasonable minimums are $1,800/year for a family with no minors
or two small minors, to $2,160/year for three or more minors). These
minimum incomes may soon be the incomes of families with no jobs, but
receiving public assistance (if the President's new bill on guaranteed
income passes). Thus it is quite conceivable that McKissick may need
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to begin county negotiations for establishing some type of local housing
agency that will be eligible to receive funds for public housing.
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CHAPTER VIII. AN ANALYSIS OF PROBABLE ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Once the prime developer has thoroughly evaluated his probable
bargaining position with each potential sub-developer, he is now in
a position to schedule a path of implementation that will allow him to
judiciously take advantage of the strength and weaknesses of each. To
put it all together, the pertinent elements are: the potential market
factors that indicate the probable nature of the incoming market and
their specific housing requirements; the availability of the appropriate
sub-developers; and the financial position of the prime developer,
McKissick.
Up to this point, we have looked at the probable market factors and
contingent strategies for land development, and the sub-developer's
characteristics. We have not, except in a very general way, seriously
analyzed the projected financial position of the prime developer. We
have alluded to the fact that his solvency may go a long way toward
strengthening his bargaining position with sub-developers.
In their most recent economic model submitted to HUD, McKissick sets
down his financial projections for Soul City over the twenty-year
development period based on land sales, operation of a private utility
company and interest rates received from loans made to the Soul City
associational government. The sale of land represents the major pro-
portion of proceeds accruing to the developer, and is dependent on a
projected rate of sales per year throughout the development period.
In order to get a fairly realistic picture of the probable development
path the prime developer should take, I've extrapolated from this
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economic model the yearly profits (or losses) and the retained earnings
of McKissick Enterprises. These projections by McKissick were probably
based on a smooth, unhindered development period. For the housing analy-
sis, the projected pace of land sales was translated into the probable
number of housing units built. By coupling the number of housing units
to- be built in any one year, with the profits (or losses) accruing to the
prime developer, I am suggesting that this information may be the final
ingredient needed to predict a probable staging of development.
Chart VIII-a. shows the revenues vs. expenses over the twenty-year
development period. Chart VIII-b. shows the retained earnings (or
build-up in equity) over the twenty-year period. (Note: Because
McKissick personally requested that the actual figures remain confiden-
tial, I am using only approximate numbers. However, the chart does
accura.ely reflect the general financial state of the prime developer.)
Chart VIII-c. shows the projected pace ;of housing development over the
twenty-year period.
McKissick begins to show a small "profit" in year four of the development
period. However, his overall retained earnings are not positive until
about year seven (total outstanding liabilities at that point are
exceeded by total assets). In reality, these figures and projections
may be optimistic, especially when you consider that concessions to sub-
developers in land prices may have to be surrendered, which will have
the effect of flattening the profit curve, and extending the time when
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the prime developer will operate in the red. Nevertheless, we will assume
for the purposes of the up-coming predictive model that these profit pro-
jections are realistic.
The chart showing probable staging of housing (Chart VIII-c.) reflects
McKissick's assumption that Soul City's development will occur in three
distinct phases. (The economic model refers to the development of three
villages, which seemingly shows the influence of the Rouse plan of
Columbia). Years seven and fourteen seem to be bellwether years sig-
nalling the termination of one phase and the beginning of another. In
one sense, this "village" concept does not seem entirely consistent with
the land development strategy proposed earlier, since it implies total
development of specific geographical areas, before proceeding to another.
I prefer to make my own assumptions to rationalize adhering to McKissick's
projected development pace, based on the peculiar needs of the prime
developer to satisfy both financial and social goals. First, the years
one through seven show a progressive upward trend in housing production.
These years should be characterized by brisk sale and production, to
establish a reasonable degree of activity (which attracts publicity and
buyers), but more so to defray the tremendous carrying charges on land
and infrastructure costs at a time when they are highest to the prime
developer. The middle years starting with year eight and ending at
year fourteen show a definite decline in production.. This seems reason-
able, since the "newness" of the town, and the accompanying publicity
that it received at its inception, will have waned by that time. Thus,
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the growth rate should slow and probably stagnate as new institutions
and residents begin to settle down to the new environment. I cannot
account for the sudden jump in production at year fourteen, except to
speculate that, having completed the major portion of infrastructure
work, the developer deliberately stimulates production by becoming
directly involved in housing construction. The production again slows
as year twenty approaches, signalling the exhaustion of all available
developable land.
We shall then assume that all the projections on financial return and
production pacing made by McKissick are valid for the purposes of the
following model. The model brings together: (1) the prime developer's
financial position and expected production pace; (2) the expected low-
income market characteristics (based on earlier assumptions about that
market); (3) the prime developer's motivations as they relate to his
financial position and the market; (4) the probable choice of sub-deve-
lopers; (5) the probable concessions required to induce sub-developers;
(6) the overall implications for low-income housing development. To
conform to McKissick's notion of three distinct phases in the develop-
ment, the model is divided to reflect this: Initial years (1 through 7);
Middle years (8 through 13); and Advanced years (14 through 20).
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/I. INITIAL PERIOD: Development Years One Through .Seven
I. Financial Position and Production Pace:
23 5 7
.J~-LLL
~- LIAOI I/I/I ~,/ra
-
f~907= (WeA2L Y') i -A;r V///- bL)
k
ETArNEP EA)N/N5 z:-/ACT V//I -(6)
2. Expected Market Characteristics:
a. Primary emigration areas: urban and rural southern communities.
b. Race: predominantly black with few whites.
c. Age: predominantly 19-35 years.
d. Family composition: single males, married couples with less
than two minors.
e. Probable housing type: multi-family units (garden apartments,
mid-rise or high-rise, row houses, few single-family units.)
3. Prime Developer's Probable Motivations:
McKissick's financial position indicates that he is operating in the red
until near the end of the period. He is likely to want to sell land to
those sub-developers requiring little financial or technical support from
him, and whose efficiency and speed in production will keep pace with the
incoming population. McKissick may have to resort, in earliest years, to
mobile home settlements to handle the "transient" construction crews, but
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beyond that expense he is likely to not want. to extend his meager resources
into housing development.
4. Likely Choice of Sub-Developer (in order of preference):
a. Type III - Housing Development Companies (HDC's)
1. their ability to build multi-family units for
both low and high income groups;
2. no major cost incurred by prime developer in
support role.
b. Type IV - Major Non-profit Companies
1. a professional developer capable of building
multi-family units for low income;
2. will satisfy some social welfare objectives;
3. no major costs to the developer in a supporting
role.
c. Type I - Merchant Builders (preferably versatile medium-
to-large size)
1. ability to produce single-family units and a
possible producer of multi-family units;
2. no major costs incurred by prime developer in a
supporting role.
5. Probable Concessions:
a. Lower land prices or long-term installment purchases to
minimize r±.sks. (Types III, IV, I)
b. Relaxation of training requirements for employment of
unskilled indigenous workers. (Types III, I)
c. Relaxation of design review process. (Types III, I)
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6. Implications for Overall Housing Development:
The utilization of large "outside" professional sub-developers reflects
the prime developer's concern with efficiency, speed, and minimal cost to
him. The price for this efficiency and expertise, is minimal involvement
of community people (those first locating in Soul City or in the surrounding
areas) in the planning or construction of housing. With the predominant
housing type being multi-family units, and the corresponding investment
outlook of major developer, it appears that residents will primarily be
renters rather than owners, and tenant participation is likely to be held
at token levels. (Significant participation reflected only by housing
provided by non-profit developer, Type IV).
Finally, the physical environment may not radically change in appearance
from that usually seen in most suburban developments. Relaxation of
design review really means the right of sub-developers to design, and
build as they had previously been accustomed. Thus, no new innovations
in housing design or planning are likely to be revealed in the first
seven years.
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II.- MIDDLE PERIOD: Development Years Eight through Thirteen
1. Financial Position and Production Pace:.
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2. Expected Market Characteristics (predominant):
a. primary emigration areas: urban and rural southern communities;
some small influx from northern communities.
b. Race: predominantly black with rising proportion of whites and
other minority races.
c. Age (head of household):. 19-50.
d. Family composition: predominantly married couples with children,
from infancy to teen-age; some female-headed families; fewer
young singles, but slow increase in elderly population.
e. Probable housing type: lower density housing - single-family
units, duplexes, row houses; less emphasis on higher density,
mid- and high-rise apartments.
3. Prime Developer's Probable Motivation:
Charts VIII-a.(2) and VIII-b.(2) indicate that the developer is now
operating in the black and is also in a position to exert greater leverage
in bargaining. The slower growth rate indicated in Chart VIII-c.(2), and
the market indications of an older more stable population reflect the
gradual incorporation of ancillary services, such as schools, recreation,
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etc. Given his financial position, and his previous success, McKissick
might take advantage of the middle years to encourage the development of
indigenous and local groups in housing development.
Although land sales at a rapid pace may still be important, his financial
standing would seem to be able to support the development of the smaller,
less experienced groups. Furthermore, his profits may be used at this
point to buy back existing projects from the major developers who built
in previous years. This may be quite reasonable between years ten and
thirteen when presumably Type III developers may be willing to sell,
after having gotten their major profits due to depreciation and interest.
Upon such a sale, McKissick could resell this property to community
cooperatives, or existing tenants, etc. Finally, surplus funds might be
further utilized in research and development of new and innovative tech-
niques for housing production, or to underwrite the cost of establishing
an on-site construction industry (materials supply franchise, lumber
company, etc.)
4. Likely Choice of Sub-Developers: (Rather than depend solely on the
major "outside" developers, McKissick may begin to shift emphasis to
community developers while bargaining for greater concessions from those
major builders wishing to develop further during this period.)
a. Type V - Indigenous Community Developers (ICD's)
1. satisfies goals of community involvement with
development at all levels;
2. plausible resource for future development of
housing.
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b. Type II - Small Home Builders
I. satisfies goals related to providing economic
opportunities;
2. predominant market demand for low-density
single-family house makes him eligible as a
sub-developer;
3. plausible resource for future development of
housing.
c. Type VI - Joint Ventures (by McKissick with other developers)
1. utilization of resources to experiment with
new techniques;
2. may be required with some community developers.
d. Types I, III, IV - for same basic reasons stated in the
,initial years.
5. Probable Concessions:
a. Direct expenditures of time, money, and personnel to encourage
development. (Types V, II, VI)
b. Concession on land sales prices, purchase money mortgages, etc.
(Types II, V, III)
6. Overall Implications for Housing Development in Soul City:
The probable increase in perceived community participation is socially
desirable. I use "perceive," because in reality McKissick as "benefactor"
may control to a large extent the nature and direction of development by
ICD's and small home builders. Nevertheless, the "image" of local, iden-
tifiable grass roots participation in development may be valuable in
raising hopes of community residents, who heretofore witnessed most
development by "outsiders." Such developers may cause a significant
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number of local people to become involved in construction training
programs. (McKissick may have to underwrite a portion of training costs.)
Homeownership and control over housing may begin to grow as ICD's evolve
into cooperative ownerships, as single-family units are sold to modest
income residents, and as resale of property goes to community groups.
There are likely to be the first signs of design or housing innovations
caused by the developer's increased leverage over sub-developers, and the
possibilities of using joint ventures to research and experiment with new
techniques.
Overall, the middle years can possibly be characterized as years of
ferment and maturation. Small indigenous groups will be introduced to
housing development which is considered socially desirable. But the
tradeoff may be an overall "appearance" of stagnation, waste, and ineffi-
ciency. An increasingly diverse population, being introduced to home
ownership and participation politics, is also socially desirable, but
this new perception of power and influence may cause the polarization
and factionalization of residents as they seek to acquire more power.
Finally, the middle years mark the period when the prime developer reaches
financial solvency, but despite his stronger control over sub-developers,
his influence in the town may actually wane, as other institutions develop
constituencies, among residents and as the town residents begin to clamor
for more power.
It is, however, during these middle years of apparent stagnation, pressure
politics, and the prime developer's declining influence, that the real
character of Soul City will possibly begin to emerge.
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III.. ADVANCED PERIOD: Development Years Fourteen through Twenty
1. Financial Position and Production Pace:
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2. Expected Market Characteristics:
a. Primary emigration areas: scattered - urban north and south,
rural south, and other areas.
b. Race: mixture black, white, and other minority groups.
c. Age (head of household): 19 years and up.
d. Family composition: all varieties - young and elderly childless,
couples with children, young and old male and female singles.
e. Probable housing type: diverse - multi-family, duplexes, single-
family.
3. Prime Developer's Probable Motivation:
McKissick, in the latter years, may feel compelled to push for final
completion of the project at a more rapid pace than the middle years.
Having possibly evaluated the way existing. residents utilized their
housing and the degree of fit between tenant and physical shelter, the
prime developer may now have a better command of what the market wants.
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His small scale research and demonstration projects in the middle years
may result in a decision to produce the new techniques or housing on a
more massive scale. To further social goals on community participation,
McKissick may introduce and support new groups of small builders and ICD's,
but on a more limited basis. (Presumably a portion of the profits can
support these groups, but McKissick may be forced to distribute larger
shares to his investors, in addition to acquiring new land for other
projects.) Possibly a greater reliance on older ICD's (Type IV) and
Type VI developers may be called for, because of their experience gained
in earlier projects. Such ICD's and home builders may require little
capital costs to the developer, while offering him the chance for easy
bargaining to induce participation. (He may be able to successfully
encourage innovative design approaches, etc.) The larger Type I and
Type III developers will still want in on the action (more so since the
risks are now minimized). McKissick's bargaining position woul, be con-
siderably stronger than in the earlier years. His financial status, his
previous track record, and the availability of other sub-developers are
factors contributing to this. Few, if any, concessions may need to be
given up. In fact, McKissick may now be in a position to require more
community involvement with developemtn by these sub-developers. (The
existing community could conceivably exert counter pressure since they
may be loathe to having "outsiders" come in for a profit.) Despite
their efficiency and capability, McKissick may choose not to deal with
them, given the political cost related to expected community protests.
The public housing authority may be a limited developer in the advanced
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years since the possibility does exist that in a diverse cross-section
of population approaching 50,000 people, some families may not be
covered under existing programs.
4. Likely Choice of Sub-Developers (in order of preference):
a. Type VI - Joint Venture
1. to support new methods and innovative design;
2. to fulfill unmet goals.
b. Type V and Type TI - Indigenous community developers;
Small Homebuilders
1. to take advantage of their newly-acquired
experience;
2. to foster development and growth of new groups.
c. Types I, III, and IV - Professional Builders
1. to insure completion of required housing units.
d. Type VII - Public Housing Agencies
1. as a last resort to guarantee inclusion of all
income groups in decent shelter.
5. Probable Concessions:
a. Direct expenditures of time, money and'personnel to support
new cammunity developers (Type V, Type II)
6. Implications for Overall Housing Development:
The advanced years of development might well be characterized as years
of introspection, research, and evaluation. Although the prime deve-
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loper's tendency may be to "get on" with the completion of the town, his
emphasis should be less on a frenetic pace of activity and sales, and
more on execution and fulfillme.nt of yet unattained goals. Thus, despite
the fact that the production of housing is more prolific between year
fouteen and eighteen, the increased rate may be more attributable to
technology and market conditions rather than a need to "finish rapidly."
To further evaluation and in-depth analysis of how housing can be made
more responsive to the needs of the consumer, McKissick may well seek
funds at this point or make outright grants to support "local housing
sessions" to study this and other social issues. Experienced ICD's
should be prime candidates for participation in such sessions, for in
taking on new development, many of these developers will for the first
time be able to look beyond the sticky problems of administration and
application processing, to the more significant questions of how to
broaden the participation process in design and development to further
maximize the utility of the final physical product. Evaluation of their
past efforts are likely to produce a desire to correct their efforts and
mistakes. What might evolve are systematic techniques to evaluate user
needs and user response to the housing environemnt. The design process
might broaden to include surrogate clients paid to engage in "charette"
sessions in order to help "professional designers" to find a more
accurate "fit" in physical product. Whatever the new approaches,
McKissick may find value in financially support ng such new innovations.
By maintaining amicable rapport with his protege community developers,
it is not inconceivable that the last years of hous4 ng development in
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Soul City may resemble a kind of "working laboratory" researching new
social and technical ways of improving the quality of housing and
housing services.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE MODEL
Over the long haul, the above projections on the possible path of housing
development seem quite logical, given the factors of market, the finan-
cial position of the prime developer, and the special characteristics
of the sub-developers.
Even when you view this development on a social or environmental continuum
it seems to make sense. We have argued that, in the initial years of town
growth, the purely business constraints placed on the prime developer may
force him to utilize outsiders primarily to "prime" the development
process, largely because they require less cost to him and are able to
carry on efficiently and over a short period of time. However, by using
such developers, we have also implied that the prime developer may be
placed in a weaker bargaining position (given his financial status and
the comparative expertise of large experienced sub-developers), and as
such may be unable to carry through on certain social and environmental
goals immediately. Thus, the town's character in those first years may
not be radically different from the typical "suburban" development,
possibly evidencing no "newness" in design or planning techniques. In
fact, I suggest that construction innovations, social innovations, and
design innovations will be characterized by a kind of gradual evolution
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over the twenty-year development period, and. quite possibly will continue
long after McKissick has left the Soul City scene.
This gradual evolution, "by accident," may be socially beneficial when
you consider the problems of acculturation of the incoming population
to a new environment.
It has been stated, and proved by sales figures, that the Reston failure
was largely due to a fallacious assumption on the part of the prime
developers that middle-income families would desire an urbane, sophisti-
cated architectural environment made up predominantly of contemporary
multi-family housing. Robert Simon, the prime developer, ignored the
fact that Americans identified "home" as a single-family, traditionally-
designed house in almost nine out of ten cases. By insisting on the
contemporary atmosphere, the prime was forced into serious financial
deficits, and ultimately had to -be bailed out by new investment backers.
Although Reston today enjoys some degree of success in selling the con-
temporary units, it appears as if the public had to gradually respond
or be educated to the benefits of such an environment.
The lesson for Soul City developers may be that gradual evolution into
a "new" kind of environment may be an asset, for handling acculturation
problems of both low and upper income residents. Although low-income
residents may not presently be living under the best of circumstances,
they do tend to visualize their "dream" environment along the lines of
the typical middle or upper class symbols prevalent at the time. Thus,
the rural farmhand in Warren County may desire the opportunity of a
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three-bedroom single-family house rather than a "Habitat," with its radical
visual appearance and extremely high density, simply because he can relate
to the single-family house in his everyday experience. This may also
apply to potential upper-income residents of Soul City. Aside from the
appearance, density, or type of housing that people are likely to hold up
as ideal models, the concept of "space" may also be a critical factor. A
former Harlem resident may not clearly understand the significance of
communal open space, nor his rights and responsibilities with regard to
that space. Similarly, rural residents may clamor for territoriality,
that is, private front and back yards or places where they can plant
vegetable gardens. I submit that a sophisticated plan that relies heavily
on "ambivalent" (to the unfamiliar user) communal spaces may be a tactical
mistake in the eariy years, largely because residents may not be able to
relate to it, or may have internalized some other more appropriate con-
cept of an ideal physical and social environment.
I do not argue for a permanent "status quo" environment, but I do suggest
that innovation for innovation's sake may clearly reflect an "elitist,"
"we know best," attitude on the part of designers and planners. It
would seem more plausible to engage in a gradual process of education,
stimulation, experimentation and token innovations, rather than pushing
for radical change immediately. Although I'm aware that the prime deve-
loper, by the time new residents begin to arrive, has made a substantial
investment in infrastructure (probably based on some "innovative" master
planning concept) and is not wont to change once this investment is made,
I would argue that in early phases the "above ground" manifestations of
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the infrastructure (roads) should not be radically different from standard
planning concepts. This then allows for a gradual, in-depth analysis of
the need, if any, for innovative techniques. Thus, if you start with
token innovations and allow for rigorous feed-back sessions with the
initial settlers, a more responsive evaluation can be made related to
people's needs. This avoids a priori assumptions, fads, and values to
be imposed by the planners and designers. Of course, professional planners
and architects in any real situation will try to educate the public (I do
feel that this is part of their responsibility), but at least in the
scenario I suggest, they will be forced into a dialogue with user groups
which cannot help but be beneficial to both parties.
The same type of argument can be made regarding community participation
and honeownership which may be only token in the initial years, due to
the sub-developers characteristic investment outlook. Immediate control
or homeownership for low-income residents may not always be a socially
desirable panacea to solve social problems. But the expectation of
control or ownership, and the incumbent period of preparing for that
eventuality may be beneficial, since it allows the resident the chance
to assess bhe implications, limitations and responsibilities inherent
in such a situation. Let me emphasize, lest I be misunderstood as a
supporter of gradualism, that the key element here is the expectation of
eventual control or ownership. If the residents in the first years per-
ceive that control may never be forthcoming, they have the right and the
responsibility to protest and bring pressure to bear on the developers.
However, in a situation where they systematically begin to assume
-157-
responsibility for their housing or other areas, the slower process may
be an invaluable experience, more so than the situation of immediate
and complete control with no prior knowledge of the responsibilities and
obligations of such a role.
So, it does not bother me that many of the stronger and more innovative
goals for Soul City will come over a period of time, and not as some
immediate outpouring of benefits. Although the developer might see his
position in the earlier years as disadvantageous, he may conceivably
utilize this period and subsequent periods (as I suggested earlier) for
in-depth analysis and research to assess where, how and why Soul City
should be a new and innovative prototype.
V. OTHER PROBABLE FUTURES
The above model for implementation assumes critical factors that may,
in reality, never occur, which could then reduce its overall feasibility.
We assumed the following:
1. Subsidy funds for low and moderate income housing programs
would be available, as needed, throughout the twenty-year
development period.
2. That the migration of population into the city would
maintain the desired balance of low to upper income groups.
3. That McKissick's financial bacters would be equally
motivated toward social welfare objectives and would agree
to profit cutbacks.
4. That low-income residents will all want to participate
actively in housing development.
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The absence of any one of these factors could crucially affect the
development process, and the overall character of Soul City. The following
sections briefly review the probable alternative patterns of development
and the implications for Soul City as they relate to the town's original
goals and objectives.
1. Inadequate subsidies to support low-income housing.
I have stressed throughout this study that in planning the development of
low-income housing, the prime developer must establish considerable poli-
tical rapport at all levels of the HUD bureaucracy to insure the easy
flow of funds to support his housing programs. Conceivably, if this is
done (and subsidy funds have been appropriated by Congress), McKissick
should experience no serious curtailment of funds to the project.
Furthermore, because the prime developer out of necessity is required to
get' the total town guaranteed under the provisions of the New Communities
Act of 1968 (Title IV), HUD will be forced to insure that it does its
part in making Soul City fail-safe.
Nevertheless, there is the possibility that despite "good political
connections," subsidies may not be available when needed. Conditions in
the national economy, a shift in national policies or priorities, the
war in Southeast Asia, etc., are all external factors that might cause
a drying-up of federal subsidies for housing.
To examine the alternatives open to McKissick, given this occurrence,
I shall assume that all the other assumptions, goals, objectives and
factors posited in the first model are fixed, with only the subsidy
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factor as a variable. The following probable scenario seems most
likely:
a. McKissick would still rely on professional developers
(Types I and III) in the early years for efficiency, speed,
and quick sale of land. The professional non-profit deve-
loper (Type IV) would be eliminated because of his dependence
on federal subsidies.
b. Housing could be prod-ced only at market rates in early
years, automaticaliy excluding low-income families. Professional
sub-developers are likely to be attracted more favorably to a
middle-income market, largely because of higher profit potential
(both in rental tenure and in profit margins on the sale of
higher priced houses), and a perceived minimization of risks.
c. Market rate housing would remain predominant even in
middle and advanced periods of development. However, because
McKissick will want to try to further the goals of economic
heterogeneity in population, he may utilize his growing profits
in these years to "subsidize" some low-income units. It is
not likely that the amount of funds that the prime developer
will deploy for such purposes will be sufficient to house any
significant number of the low-income market. Furthermore,
such "subsidies" can only be one-shot ventures (gross write-
down in land cost, interest-free loans, etc), that may not
sufficiently reach the lower levels of that target market.
(Under federal programs subsidies continue for the full
economic life of the housing, whereas McKissick will leave
Soul City in twenty years.
The social and physical implications of such a development pattern are
momentous. What in effect one visualizes is another Reston or Columbia --
a planned middle class suburban community with a very minute population
of low- and moderate-income families. (Some will argue that new tech-
nology and industrialized housing systems may, over the twenty-year
period, reduce construction cost substantially, so as to be affordable
by low-income families. This may be a possibility, but evidence to date
seems to suggest that industrialized techniques, while increasing- the
speed of housing production, will not significantly lower the price of
housing to poor families without subsidies.)
-160-
The question I cannot completely resolve in my mind is whether or not such
an alternative pattern of development can be termed a "failure" as it
relates to Soul City goals. There is a reasonably valid argument that
can be asserted, that it is a good thing to establish the town with a solid
middle class population. By doing so, more jobs will be created as indus-
tries seek to take advantage of this middle-class labor supply. Although
manufacturing jobs will be available to the poor (a given assumption),
the introduction of more sophisticated and higher paying jobs could, in
the long run, be advantageous to the total region in furthering the goals
-of upward economic mobility. Furthermore, as the poor increases his
income from the initial low skill jobs, he may on his own seek to improve
his housing environment despite the fact that Soul City is not "open to
him." The long-range net effect is an improved physical environment.
If this argument is valid, presumably McKissick Enterprises can take some
consolation. But this would seem to be primarily in terms of satisfying
economic goals. Socially, the pattern of development describes a situa-
tion where "class" conflicts are actually heightened - i.e., while low-
income families will be economically better off, communication between
socio-economic groups will be almost non-existent since low-income fami-
lies will be commuters or "outsiders," who will have to exert unusual
effort and ingenuity to gain access to the few available units of housing
inside the town.
In terms of McKissick's own personal obligation to his national
constituency, it is not expected that he would suffer much loss in
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prestige. Presumably, he can always argue that "external" factors prevented
the development of low-income housing, rather than negligence or failure
on his part to push such a program.
2. The probability of an unbalanced economic population mix.
The alternative pattern of development above indicates a large homogeneous
middle-class population due to lack of subsidies. In effect this is con-
trary to Soul City goals of an economically diverse population, but the
developer is absolved since he may have no cont-ol over the external
factors that precipitated it. However, given internal factors of location,
attractiveness, and marketing, this alternative purports to deal with the
possibility of a large influx of one socio-economic group as opposed to
another (specifically, the attraction of more low-income families than
there are housing units to support).
Given the fact that Soul City is located in a regionally depressed area,
there is a strong possibility that a new town (publicized as it is now
currently being done as a place for advancement of disenfranchised groups)
will appear to be an "oasis" for the poor populations in the regional
area. Quite likely, the projected 4,500 units of low-income housing will
be insufficient. (We are assuming again that subsidies are now available.)
The problem is whether or not McKissick will be forced into the position
of turning away large numbers of poor families. One answer is that the
p-ime developer is not directly responsible for the inflow of residents.
The sub-developers, as owners of the housing, usually will engage 'in the
screening of applicants. Thus, given a large demand for low-income units
in Soul City, I would project the following:
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a. In early stages professional sub-developers (Types I, III
and IV) can be expected to set high requirements for applicants
seeking to minimize their risks. Presumably they would choose
those tenants who came closest to satisfying middle-class traits
(i.e., upward mobility, economic stability, life style, etc.).
b. In middle and later years, professionals would maintain
these patterns of screening. Conceivably as indigenous deve-
lopers become involved, they may be more lenient (i.e. setting
somewhat different standards) although some objectivity will
be sacrificed since friends and relatives of the co munity
developers may get first priority.
These projections would seem to indicate that in cases of large demand,
only those low-income residents who are upwardly mobile, industrious, or
with "connections" will gain access to Soul City. The "marginal" poor
(the elderly, the indigent, the social outcast, etc.), precisely the
group in need of most help, may be denied access to the housing and services
available in Soul City.
In all likelihood, McKissick may be held accountable if he supports the
above policy. As a champion of civil rights, critics and skeptics at the
national and regional level are certain to question whether or not Soul
City had really solved the problem of providing the "hopeless" poor with
opportunity, or had merely made it easier for a segment of "poor" people
who would have advanced anyway without Soul City. (McKissick may wince
at such charges, since he has levelled the same criticism at other social
welfare programs aided by the federal government.) He may choose to take
the criticisms and suffer some loss in prestige, or he may look for other
alternatives. One such alternative would be central control of housing
sales, funded by the sub-developers, but carried out by an independent
(McKissick directed) sales staff. The sub-developers, for their part,
would be relieved of this responsibility, while. McKissick would gain the
opportunity to coordinate screening of applicants. Another side benefit
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to coordination of sales is that all residents would receive the same
"sales pitch" regarding the opportunities and limitations of Soul City,
thus reducing the chance of misunderstandings and misconceptions that may
be inherent in numerous independent sales staff representing each sub-
developer. In any case, however, McKissick will be confronted with
screening applicants, and the contingent factor of discriminating against
some of them. At best, he will be able to control or "balance" the com-
position of the low-income (and high-income) population, which may be
reasonable for an "experimental" town.
There is a counter argument that challenges the validity of assuming a
large influx of poor residents. The argument is that the mere inertial
effort of seeking and processing an application will discourage all but
the most active of the low-income population. Most of the other poor will
exert no effort to gain access. Furthermore, certain cultural characte-
ristics work against the large migration. The fact that a significant
number of rura. poor pay little or nothing for housing may mean that they
may be unwilling to pay the 20% to 25% of their newly increased income
(assume that they want new jobs) for housing. Thus, the working of the
market and the process of "natural selection" make the question of an
overflow of low-income families a moot one.
The argument above assumes that the majority of the poor are apathetic,
docile, and lacking the iniative to improve their circumstances. This
may well have been true as short a time ago as five years. But even
McKissick's assumptions about the political savvy of the population in
rural southern communities would seem to refute the notions about apathy.
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(See Chapter Two.) In Warren County, where 67% of the population is black
and poor, activists, organizers and a plethora of federal welfare programs
have resulted in increasing the activism of a significant segment of that
community. Given similar political awakenings in surrounding counties,
it may be a gross mistake to assume that a goodly portion of the poor will
not show considerable interest in Soul City.
3. McKissick Enterprises relationship to investors.
In the original model, we assumed that McKissick was entirely free to
deploy the profits accruing to the corporation in socially beneficial
ventures. This automatically meant lower profit margins, which his
investors may or may not wish to adopt as a feasible strategy. The
willingness of the financial backers is largely determined by their moti-
vations for investment in the project. Private investors obviously
invest funds for some stipulated rate of return, bu given the social
overtones of this venture, what may have been a 30% return may be
reduced to 10% to insure success of social welfare goals. Thus, criti-
cal to McKissick's selection criteria for investors is the degree of
social motivation of each investor, since onLy those so motivated may be
easily persuaded to accept a lower return. (The whole concept of
"selecting" investors may seem ludicrous to the prime developers, given
their present difficulty in securing adequate financial backing -- they
may be prone not to be too discriminating!)
Assuming that McKissick does not discriminate in his choice of financial
backers, these likely developments might occur:
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a. Early years of development would proceed much as described
in the original proposed model. (Professional developers, fast
development, minimal community involvement.)
b. Middle or later years would proceed with use of professional
sub-developers primarily. Community developers in smaller
numbers may be created but receive little if any support by
prime developers. (Presumably, investors may be pleased with
the efficiency and higher profits of the professionals -- but
as a token gesture might allow a few community developers to
"grope" through a few projects, by giving funds as payment of
political debt to keep the community placated.)
c. Aside from token participation by community developers,
residents of low-income housing built by professionals may
have little input into management and control issues, if the
prime developer backed by his investors perceives that such
rights and privileges curtail maximum profits due to ineffi-
ciencies.
McKissick stands to lose in social terms, but gains considerably in terms
of the financial or business aspects of the project. It may be that all
the desired low-income units are built, but they may be little more than
shelters. To cross his backers, McKissick runs the risk of being eli-
minated by them, which may be as embarrassing as the criticism he is sure
to receive from social critics. Furthermore, to risk being eliminated
would insure the outcome projected above. Seemingly, the only recourse
left to him is persuasion and utilization of his political prestige as a
stick to force compliance. The best device, in the long run, is the
initial selection of backers whose social welfare motivations coincide
with the aims of Soul City.
4. Reluctant participation by community in housing development.
We have assumed up to this point that the furtherance of social goals
related to housing hinged on a strategy of direct involvement of community
people in all phases of housing development. The strategy of community
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participation has become popular in the country over the past five years,
and is grounded in the theory that people desire to have more direct con-
trol over those things that affect their daily lives. Thus, in Soul City
the assumption is made that housing development is responsive to the poor
only if they can become intimately involved with its development. What if
this assumption is wrong or overplayed?
It is quite conceivable that, given all of the most favorable conditions
for development of housing, low-income families may desire no significant
amount of involvement with the process of development if they perceive
that their physical (and social) needs are being adequately met by utili-
zation of traditional development patterns. By the time McKissick Enter-
prises seeks indigenous developers, they may find few groups, if any,
wanting to become involved or wishing to allocate the required time.
Even those residents that "recognize". the value of active community par-
ticipation may further recognize that part-time involvement on top of
full-time employment on a job would take away time from engagement in
other less cumbersome activities in Soul City.
McKissick may choose to ignore the paucity of community groups interested
in engaging in housing development. But the danger is that such a
situation may reflect only a temporary enchantment by residents with the
new town, that may backfire in later years when the newness will have
worn off. However, it cannot be denied that, for the most part, the
large middle class that resides in United States suburban communities
seems to be quite satisfied with their housing and seemingly exert no
serious efforts to radically change that environment. Thus, it is
possible that large professional sub-developers may adequately satisfy
the housing needs of the poor.
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I am not convinced that McKissick should not try to alter this tendency
to apathy. In the sense that Soul City is an experimental town, the
developers may need to try out ideas for community involvement, since
they may have applicability in other sections of the country, even if
not apparently desired in Soul City. Rather than waiting for community
people to volunteer, the prime developer may have to become a proselytizer
of his own goals, possibly even going beyond the Soul City area to recruit
the interested groups.
My final point goes back to the issue of Floyd McKissick's national
prestige. Because he seeks solutions to major national problems in the
Soul City project, he can ill afford to be taken in by seductive profit
projections or apparent apathy. Failure to actively pursue widely-held
social goals may appear to some in the national public as a sell-out to
traditionalism and the dollar.
VI. CONCLUSION
Of the five possible futures offered, I'm inclined to hope that something
resembling the first model is finally implemented, for it seems to satisfy
most of the objectives. In reality, some aspect of all the probable
futures will occur. Subsidies may never be available in abundance
throughout the period. However, it is also unlikely that they will be
non-existent for any significant length of time. Predicting residential
population mix to effect some "optimum" balance may be impossible to
fine-tune through screening, but this may be the only feasible device to
get some semblance of congruency. Financial backers, even the most
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liberal, will be unable to plow back into social projects enough money to
adequately meet Soul City's needs, although I submit that even the most
conservative investor (by virtue of his investment in the Soul City pro-
ject) will allow some profits to be deployed. Finally, McKissick is not
likely to relax his emphasis on social goals to any significant degree,
largely because his years of investment in building a national constituency
of advocates for the poor will far exceed the probable financial gains
inherent in a wholly profit-orientation (which he could have pursued in
a less "visible" fashion).
Despite these and possibly numerous other outcomes to housing implementation,
it is not probable that any single factor will occur in any extreme form
that would result in total destruction of the concept. The net effect
will be some gradual dilution of the overall objective. I.e., Objective
#3 calling for one-third low-income housing may end up as one-fifth low-
income; or Objective #1 calling for an essentially open housing environment
accessible to all families may technically be inoperable due to implicit
screening of applicants.
Nevertheless, I believe it is apparent that the prime developer's
awareness of crucial factors'-of development will go a long way in maxi-
mizing the fit of goals and objectives to the final result.
McKissick Enterprises, in my opinion, has undertaken a tremendous task
in moving into the area of city-building. The opportunity for making a
significant physical and social contribution to the country are within
the realm of possibility. The neophyte character of the organization
means that much of what they do will probably be fresh and innovative,
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simply because they are not duty-bound by traditional practices. But it
is precisely because they are new to the development idiom that their
chances of failing are greater than their chances of success. In addition
to inexperience, they are bringing to the project the two-fold mission
of profit and social welfare motivations, a seemingly difficult balancing
act that will require considerable skill in reconciling. It is hoped
therefore that such a study, if ever read by McKissick Enterprises' staff
members, can serve as an extra set of "eyes," identifying those road-
blocks, opportunities, strategies, and issues that may not, as yet, have
been recognized by the existing staff, with the intention that early
assessment and cognizance of these elements may lead to positive evalua-
tion of where successes are evident and failures are likely to occur.
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( Anthony Downs makes a different prediction for future urban
growth placing less emphasis on new towns.)
Downs, Anthony--"Alternative--Forms Of Future Urban Growth In
The United States"--AIP Journal-- January,
1970--p.p. 3- 11
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-ment guarantees loans to private developers
for land acquisition and development of new
communities and towns.)
6. "Floyd McKissick Is Planning A New Town"-- City, October, 1969
p.p. 38-39
7. Evidence of the changing mood of blacks was clear in the
writings of Lomax, Baldwin, and Bennett in the days preceding
the cry of "black power*.
Baldwin, James-- The Fire Next Ti-me-- New York- Dial Press-1963
Bennett, Lerone- The Negro Mood And Other Essays-- Chicago-
Johnson Publishing Co.--1964
Lomax, Louis-- The Negro Revolt-- New York- New American
Library--1963
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8. This refers to the mardh in April,1966 of James Meridith
(first black to attend Univ. of Mississippi) from Memphis
to Jackson, Mississippi to protest racism and to demonstrate
that blacks need not fear for their lives in Mississippi.
Meridith was subsequently shot after completing only one-
third of this journey, creating national attention and outright
rage among many blacks. Blacks flocked to Mississippi to
complete the march to Jackson; among them was Stokely Carmicheal
chairman of SNCC, who first uttered the now popular cry of
"black power" for all blacks.
9. Carmicheal, Stokely and Hamilton, Charles V.-Black Power:the
-Politics Of Liberation In Ameri o-New York--
Vintage Books--1967
10. It is generally acknowledged that organizations like the NAACP
have not yet adopted the strategy of separation or black
power. For a historical review of changing perspectives of
blacks and their relationship to the larger society;
FullinwinderS.P.-- The Mind And Mood Of Black America--
The Dorsey Press--1969
11. McKissick summarizes his views on social and economic devel-
-opment in his recent book which is primarily a review of
the black man's legal status in America.
Mckissick, Floyd B.-- Three- Fifths Of A Man- New York
MacMi.llan- 1969
12. Data on Soul City was taken from,--"A Proposal To Develop
Soul City"-- McKissick Enterprises, Inc.-- April, 1969
CHAPTER TWO
1. Section 701: Comprehensive Planning Assistance--Title VII of
the 1954 Houaing Act, which authorizes funds for public bodies
to foster sound communityregionaland statewide planning.
2. Interview with Floyd B. McKissick and Froncell Tolbert of
McKissick Enterprises, Inc.-- New York- November 8,1969
3. Interview-- with McKissick, Tolbert, Gordon Carey and Duncan
McNeil of Mckissick Enterprises, Inc.- February 16,1970
4. Operation- Uplift; Human Resources for Warren County--1966
OEO- survey of social and manpower needs for the Warren
County area.
5. Interview- McKissick and Tolbert-- New York- March 9,1970
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6. A Proposal For Development Funds For Soul City-- March 14,1970,
submitted to the Department of Housing and Urban Development-
McKissick Enterprises, Inc.
7. The Soul City Economic Model-- revised April 4, 1970- McKissick
Enterprises, Inc.
CHAPTER THREE
1. Economic Base Study Of Soul City, North Carolina --Hammer,
Greene, Siler Associates- Washington, D.C.-December,1969
2. This information can be gotten from federal regulations on specific
housing programs. One such source: FHA Minimum Property
Standards For Multi-Family Dwellings- Dept. of Housing And
Urban Development.
3. Coble, Wesley and Taylor, Daniel-- Low-Income Housing Study;
Chapel Hill- Orange County-Dept. of City and-
Regional Planning- UNC-(unpublished student
paper)--1969
CHAPTER FOUR
1. I have reference to standard theories on economic- rent as put
forth by economists such as Alonso, Thompson and others.
2. Interview- Floyd McKissick - New York- March 9, 1970
CHAPTER FIVE
1. Interview- McKissick staffers. The discussion of sub-developers
occured indirectly and informally during the period when the
staff was trying to arrive at a reasonable set of objectives
for housijg. ( February 16,1970)
2. The bulk of information on sub-developers was obtained through
interviews with specific developers of each type. To some
extent the results of these interviews were supplemented by
information obtained from existing publications. The intent
-174-
was to observe the practices of each type and to infer some
very general conclusions related to the mode of operation and
motivations of a total class of such developers. The approach
in all probability is not the best way to scholarly analyz..
the characteristics of housing producers. Nevertheless, given
the time constraint, and the general context of this study, the
insights gained from this method seem reasonable in pointing
up at least the gross differences among the potential developer
types. The interviews were with the following:
Type I-- Merchant Builders-- H.A.DeCosta-- H.A.DeCOSTA Co.
Charleston,S.C.
John Thommason- Thommason Construction
Co.--CharlotteN.C.
Jon Taylor-- Ervin Construction Co.
Charlotte, N.C.
Type III-Housing Development Co.- Sheldon Baskin- First Realty
Boston, Mass.
Denis Blackett--Housing Innovations
Boston, Mass.
Type IV- Major Non-Profit Foundations-- Pat Alvis-- Foundation
For Cooperative Housing
Stamford, Connecticut
Type V- Indigenous Community Developers- william Clement (architect)
Ebenezer-Brown-Emmanuel- Charleston,
S. C.
George Leake- Little Rock Development
Corporation--Charlotte, N.C.
3. Kaiser Commission-- A Decent Home: The Report of the President's
Committee on Urban Housing 
-- 1968 - pep. 150-155
Eichler and Kaplan-- The Community Builders- Univ. of Calif.
Press-1969--p.p.20-21
4. Ibid-- Kaiser-- p.153-- the statistical data given in the text
indicates merchant builders' general production
pattern.
5. Kaiser--op. cit. p.p. 154-156
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A.
6. From my own experience living in the Charlotte area, it was
becoming increasingly difficult for small builders and individuals
to acquire land (residential) that had not already been op-
-tioned to the Ervin firm. The effect of so dominant a corporation
was to kill off most small competitors in the Charlotte area.
Companies like Thommason survived by building housing at the
very top economic levels of the housing market, and in areas
quite removed from the urban fringe of the city.
7. Eichler and Kaplan-op. cit. --p.p.46-47
8. Ibid--p. 46
9. Kaiser-- op. cit.--p.p. 129-134
10. Interview with Duncan McNeil-- Soul City-- March,7,1970
11. Data taken from the North Carolina Census indicate that
Warren County lost, between 1960 and 1968, almost 4400 residents
Of this number, the largest percentage (70f6) were in the age
range of 19-to-34 years (presumably the most mobile segment
of the population).
12. Like most states, North Carolina requires licensing and bonding
of all contractors engaged in building construction in the
state.
13. Kaiser--op. cit.-p.p. 117-118
14. Syndications In Perspective--1968-- published case study--
Harvard Business School. This paper gives an
excellent review of the real estate failures
and swindles that occured during the boom period
of the 1920's.
15. In interviews with both Baskin of First Realty and Blackett
of Housing Innovations, the profit motivation was never denigrated
or played down.
16. Kargman is the holder of four academic degrees. He has written
numerous articles on the merits of providing a workable
national policy for housing moderate income families and was
instrumental in influencing the legislation of 221(d)(3) housing
in 1961.
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17. Gantt, HarveyB.-The 221(d)(3) Application Process: Two Case
Studies--196 9 - unpublished student paper.
( study concluded that experienced developers
of housing encountered less resistance from
the federal bureacracy than inexperienced
counterpartsthus they are likely to get
faster servicing and committments on their
projects)
18. Friedman, Laurence,M.-- Government And Slum Housing--Rand
McNally-1968
(an excellent historical analysis of private
and public efforts to bring about decent
housing for the poor.)
19. From my own experience in the Souththere is some justification
to the allegations of minority groups, that local public
officialsfinanciersand realtors do not actively push federal
programs for housing,if that housing program represented a
threat to existing social customs(.e. integrated housing
racially). Thus, even the local federal official administering
the program may not push for maximum utilization.
20. Kaiser--op. cit.--Appendix G--p.p. 241-244
21. Gantt-- op. cit.
22. The nature of programs like 221(d)(3) and 236 require stringent
review and cost certification by FHA,which may be difficult
to carry out in programs involving volunteer or self-help
labor.
23. Kaiser--op. cit. --p. 61
24. Section 10(a)-- Housing Act of 1949 as amended.
25.SSection 204--Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968
26. All of the information on grantsloansand contributions by
the Federal Housing Authority were taken from U.S. Housing
Act of 1937 and subsequent amendments.
27. Friedman--op. cit.--chapters 3, 4,&5
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